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State v. Mollman12/23/2003
ble factors coming into play.'" Id. (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 US 560, 106 SCt 1340, 89 LEd2d 525 (1986)). Mollman failed to establish that the facts here led to an unacceptable risk that the jury considered impermissible factors.
. Apparently, the trial court observed the interaction between the deputy and Defendant and came to the conclusion that the potential jurors did not overhear their conversation. Assuming the potential jurors saw the interaction, all they saw was the deputy approaching Defendant, speaking briefly, and the two leaving the courtroom together. There is no indication that Defendant was handcuffed or that the deputy physically compelled him from the courtroom.
. The United States Supreme Court has held that the "conspicuous deployment of security personnel in a courtroom during the trial is [not] the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest[.]" Holbrook, 475 US at 568-69, 106 SCt at 1346, 89 LEd2d at 534. The court noted that there was a wide range of inferences a jury could draw from the deployment of security in the courtroom. We believe this case is more analogous to Holbrook than to those cases dealing with bringing a shackled prisoner before the jury. In this instance, any number of inferences could be drawn from Defendant leaving the courtroom with the deputy. Even assuming the potential jurors came to the conclusion that Defendant was in custody based on this encounter, this would be insufficient to show prejudice. For example, courts have consistently held that brief, inadvertent meetings between jurors and a shackled defendant are insufficient to show prejudice. Harrell v. Israel, 672 F2d 632, 637 (7th Cir 1982) (citing United States v. Figueroa-Espinoza, 454 F2d 590 (9th Cir 1972); United States v. Leach, 429 F2d 956 (8th Cir 1970), cert. denied, 402 US 986, 91 SCt 1675, 29 LEd2d 151 (1971); Hardin v. United States, 324 F2d 553 (5th Cir 1963)). If a juror sighting of a shackled prisoner is insufficient to amount to prejudice, then certainly this brief encounter where the officer exercised nothing but verbal control over Defendant is insufficient to establish the prejudice necessary to warrant a mistrial. Finally, as the Supreme Court noted in Holbrook, the defendant's right to be free from restraints:
[D]oes not mean that every practice tending to single out the accused from everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down. Recognizing that jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by choice or happenstance, we have never tried, and could never hope, to eliminate from trial procedures every reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its resources against a defendant to punish him for allegedly criminal conduct.
Holbrook, 475 US at 567, 106 SCt at 1345, 89 Ed2d at 533-534. The trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial is affirmed.
. 4. WHETHER MOLLMAN'S SENTENCE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
. Mollman argues that the unique facts of this case mitigate against the 15-year sentence imposed by the trial court. Specifically, he asserts that negligence, proximate cause and intoxication were "all very close questions" and that it is "difficult to justify a sentence that is at that harshest end of the spectrum." The State counters with the assertion that the trial court properly considered mitigating and aggravating factors, that Defendant's BAC was .13 per cent and that he failed several field sobriety tests. The State also points to the fact that Defendant has a long history of alcohol and drug abuse and driving offenses involving alcoh
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