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Lewellyn v. State5/26/1999
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Lewellyn contends that Judge Wood was collaterally estopped from finding that there was probable cause because the administrative hearing officer found that there was no probable cause. In Briggs v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, our supreme court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to an administrative hearing on a license revocation. The administrative hearing followed a district court order that granted the defendant's motion to suppress the breath test result because of problems during the administration of the test. The State dismissed Briggs' criminal case before trial.
The court concluded that collateral estoppel barred the State from using the same breath test result in an administrative proceeding to revoke Briggs' license. The administrative hearing took place after the court suppressed the breath test result. The Briggs court noted that three prerequisites must be met for collateral estoppel to apply: first, the issue decided in the first litigation must have been the same issue presented in the following litigation; second, the prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment resolving the merits of the issue; and third, there must be "mutuality" between the parties involved in the prior and current actions.
The Briggs court defined "final judgment" to include "any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect." Factors supporting a Conclusion that a decision is final for this purpose are "that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal."
The Briggs decision treated the court's pre-trial order suppressing the breath test as a final judgment for purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court considered the suppression order as "subject to appeal" though the State could only seek discretionary review. Here, Judge Wood's June 26 suppression order was first in time. Lewellyn could have sought discretionary appellate review of that order. Under the collateral estoppel doctrine applied in Briggs, Judge Wood's June 26 decision denying Lewellyn's motion to suppress was a "final judgment" for purposes of collateral estoppel. Because the district court's "final judgment" resolved the issue first, the decision in the administrative hearing could not collaterally estop the district court's suppression order.
For the above reasons, we conclude that Judge Wood did not err when he ruled that his decision that there was probable cause was not collaterally estopped by a contrary administrative decision that was later in time.
Probable cause
We now turn to Lewellyn's claim that Judge Wood erred when he ruled that Officer Buchanan had probable cause to arrest Lewellyn. Judge Wood found that the police knew from their investigation that Lewellyn was at fault in a two-vehicle traffic accident; that Lewellyn had told the police that he had made a left-hand turn, but had not seen the oncoming truck; and that Buchanan, an officer with nineteen years of experience, had detected a strong odor of alcohol and had heard Lewellyn's slurred speech during his contact with Lewellyn at the hospital. Based on these findings, Judge Wood ruled that Officer Buchanan had probable cause to arrest Lewellyn. A police officer who has probable cause to arrest may administer a preliminary breath test.
A police officer has probable cause for an arrest when he or she is aware of "facts and circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, which are 'sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution
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