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Lewellyn v. State5/26/1999
in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." While we must uphold Judge Wood's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, we exercise our independent judgment on the application of the legal rule to the facts.
We conclude that there was probable cause to arrest Lewellyn for DWI. Lewellyn had been at fault in a traffic accident; he turned left in front of an oncoming vehicle. He told police that he had not seen or been aware of that vehicle. Buchanan, an experienced officer, interacted personally with Lewellyn and smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on Lewellyn's person and heard his slurred speech. Officer Buchanan was aware of facts and circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, that were sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that Lewellyn had committed DWI. We agree with Judge Wood's ruling that Officer Buchanan had probable cause to arrest.
Privacy expectation in the emergency treatment room
Lewellyn contends that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the hospital emergency treatment room. Lewellyn relies on Article I, Section 14 and Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution. The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted a two-prong test for construing the scope of these sections. We set out this test in State v. Page:
Under these sections of the state constitution, a person is protected from unreasonable government intrusion whenever (1) the person manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in the property or activity being subjected to government scrutiny, and (2) this expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The first prong of this test (a person's subjective expectation of privacy) presents a question of fact. However, the second prong (the reasonableness of any expectation of privacy) presents a legal question. The answer to this second prong of the test rests on constitutional intent and, ultimately, on a judgment concerning the proper balance to be struck between the rights of the individual and the authority society exercises over individuals through the agency of government.
Neither party argues that the first prong was not met, and Lewellyn testified that he expected privacy. Therefore, we need only address whether the second prong was satisfied; that is, whether Lewellyn's expectation of privacy was one that society recognizes as reasonable. While Lewellyn relies on several cases from other jurisdictions, those that address the expectation of privacy in a hospital room do so when the person has been admitted for treatment and the police seize physical evidence. The cases do not discuss Lewellyn's situation -- what expectation of privacy a person has from visitors in the hospital's emergency room (or an emergency treatment room). In his decision, Judge Wood found that Lewellyn was treated in the hospital's emergency treatment room, but that he had not been admitted as a patient; he also found that the room was not private -- it had other beds in it, although they were not then occupied. He further held that, even if Lewellyn had a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was not reasonable. Specifically, Judge Wood found that:
" expectation of privacy in the three bed emergency treatment room where he was being treated and released . . . is not an expectation of privacy which society recognizes as reasonable. An emergency treatment room where a patient is being treated and released is simply not the same as a private hospital room to which a patient is admitted for the purposes of continued treatment or observation. By its nature, an emergency treatment room is
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