Maples v. State3/31/1999
lin, 442 So.2d at 157.
"In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held, that 'the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. '"A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).' Parker v. State, 482 So.2d 1336 at 1340 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). Thus, where the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence, regardless of its admissibility or its trustworthiness, the crucial question is whether the non-disclosure might have affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Kimberly, 463 So.2d 1106, 1108 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), rev'd, Ex parte Kimberly, 463 So.2d 1109 (Ala. 1984). ' he omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-02, 49 L.Ed.2d at 349. '"The principle of Mooney v. Holohan, [294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935),] is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197.' State v. Kimberly, supra, at 1108-09. The materiality of non-disclosed evidence is determined under the following analysis: where the non-disclosed evidence was specifically requested, a new trial should be granted if the non-disclosure could have affected the trial's outcome and, where the request was merely for exculpatory material or no request was made, the conviction should be reversed if the non-disclosed evidence would create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. McMullin v. State, 442 So.2d 155, 157-8 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983)." Robinson v. State, 528 So.2d 343, 345-46 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986).
In this case, there was abundant evidence of the appellant's guilt aside from the DNA evidence. Pettway v. State, 607 So.2d 325 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992); McLemore v. State, 562 So.2d 639 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989). Cf. Dubose v. State, 662 So.2d 1189 (Ala. 1995) (holding that DNA evidence was "critical evidence" because there was no other evidence, such as a confession, eyewitness testimony, or physical evidence, to connect the defendant to the crime). In this case, other evidence, including the appellant's confession, witness testimony about the appellant's actions before and after the murders, and physical evidence linked the appellant to the murders. Several witnesses saw him with the victims on the night of the murder. Terry's body was found in the appellant's driveway, and the gun used to shoot the victims was found in his residence. On the morning after the murders, the appellant cashed a check written on Terry's bank account, and witnesses testified that the signature on the check was not Terry's. When he was subsequently arrested in Nashville, the appellant had possession of Terry's vehicle. Furthermore, defense counsel admitted during closing arguments that the appellant was guilty of two counts of intentional murder, but argued that he was not guilty of capital murder because he did not commit the murders as part of one scheme or cour
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