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People v. Villa-Villa6/10/1999
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV
Ney and Ruland, JJ., concur
Defendant, Hector Villa-Villa, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving after judgment prohibited. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
I.
Defendant first contends that the trial court violated his right to present a defense by precluding his expert from testifying regarding defendant's lack of English comprehension skills. Because we conclude that such testimony was irrelevant as a matter of law, we disagree.
The mens rea element for the offense of driving after judgment prohibited is not set forth in §42-2-206(1), C.R.S. 1998. However, in People v. Parga, 964 P.2d 571 (Colo. App. 1998), announced after the trial in this case, a division of this court held that defendant's actual knowledge of the order of revocation as an habitual offender was an essential element of the offense.
The trial court in Parga had instructed the jury that defendant could be convicted not only if he actually knew his license had been revoked, but also if a reasonable person in defendant's position would have known that his license was under revocation as an habitual offender. The panel concluded that the instruction was defective because it allowed the jury to convict based on constructive knowledge:
"What is required, therefore, is direct or circumstantial evidence [sufficient] to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the fact of revocation at the time of the driving offense in question." People v. Parga, supra, 964 P.2d at 573.
See §42-2-119(2), C.R.S. 1998 (records evidencing a copy of notice and certification of mailing to person's last known address constitute prima facie proof that person received notice of revocation).
Here, defendant maintains that his lack of comprehension of the Division's letter, solely because of the language barrier, constituted a defense. Consistent with his theory, he proffered an expert who would have testified that defendant was unable to understand the notice sent because it was written in English and that, because defendant's primary language is Spanish, he lacked actual knowledge of the revocation. The trial court disallowed the expert testimony.
Initially, we note that the extent of defendant's comprehension of English was disputed. There was evidence that he had lived in the United States for over ten years, that he knew sufficient English to obtain a driver's license, and that he had followed several verbal directions given by the arresting officer after he was stopped for driving under the influence of alcohol.
However, even if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to defendant and we assume his expert would have testified that defendant lacked proficiency in the English language sufficient to understand the contents of the revocation letter, we conclude that the expert testimony was irrelevant as a matter of law.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the element of actual knowledge in this context does not require that he fully comprehended the letter of revocation that he received. Such an argument, if accepted, would mean that the Division could never revoke the license of an illiterate person or the license of an individual who had received, but had not read, the letter of revocation. Defendant's interpretation would thus lead to absurd results that are contrary to public policy.
We therefore hold that any inability of defendant to read and understand English did not render the no
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