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Russ v. City of Jacksonville5/19/1999
arguing that appellant was seeking to evade the restrictions of the protective order and to introduce the fact that Officer Baker was no longer in the DUI unit and had been criticized for stopping vehicles which did not show a suspicious driving pattern.
It is clear from the trial record that, in considering whether to allow the cross-examination, the trial Judge believed he was bound by the predecessor Judge's interlocutory ruling. After reviewing the cases upon which Russ was relying to support his impeachment of Officer Baker, the trial Judge asked whether these were the same authorities cited to the predecessor Judge and concluded that the predecessor Judge's order had established the law of the case. The trial court explained:
"The law that you cited seems to be very persuasive with respect to your position, however, I'm not prepared to go behind a ruling of a sitting Judge, having heard full argument from both of you on this subject."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the City, finding that Officer Baker had probable cause to arrest appellant.
Ruling of Predecessor Judge
It is apparent that the trial court was under the erroneous impression that it could not disturb the ruling of a predecessor Judge on the interlocutory protective order. Until final judgment, a successor Judge does have the power to vacate or modify the interlocutory rulings or orders of any predecessor Judge in the case. See Tingle v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 245 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1971); State v. Glass, 657 So. 2d 934, 935 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
While it is true that a Judge should hesitate to undo his own work, and hesitate still more to undo the work of another Judge because of the "code" of restraint based upon comity and courtesy, nevertheless when presented with a prior interlocutory ruling that is based on a clearly mistaken interpretation of the law it is indeed appropriate for the succeeding Judge to vacate or modify the prior order. Keathley v. Larson, 348 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)(footnote omitted).
Impeachment by Evidence of Officer's Prior Acts
Turning to the merits of appellant's arguments, the credibility, bias or prejudice of witnesses who testify in a case, as well as the weight to be given their testimony, are a matter for the consideration of and determination by the jury. Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462, 467-68 (Fla. 1958). Where the credibility and bias of an officer is brought into question by virtue of that officer's past acts, impeaching evidence of the officer's past acts is admissible. Henry v. State, 688 So. 2d 963, 965-66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), accord Landry v. State, 620 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also Lutherman v. State, 348 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). As the Second District Court of Appeal explained in Mendez v. State, 412 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982):
"Whenever a witness takes the stand, he ipso facto places his credibility in issue. Cross-examination of such a witness in matters relevant to credibility ought to be given a wide scope in order to delve into a witness's story, to test a witness's perceptions and memory, and to impeach that witness. . . . The right of full cross-examination is absolute, and the denial of that right may easily constitute reversible error." (Citations omitted).
Thus, we conclude it was error to preclude the cross-examination of Officer Baker based upon information relating to his prior DUI arrest practices.
We reject the City's arguments that the impeachment evidence relating to Officer Baker was impermissible general character evidence. The evidence sought to be introduced to impe
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