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Taylor v. State6/29/1999
, 441 (1) (417 SE2d 666) (1992). "In making a judicial determination of whether multiple punishment is permissible, the question is: What did the legislature intend?" (Punctuation omitted.) Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 318 (1) (297 SE2d 227) (1982). In determining legislative intent, we look first to the statute. Id. " here the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is unnecessary." Id.
OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) provides, inter alia, that " person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while" (1) under the influence of alcohol, (2) under the influence drugs, or (3) under the combined influence of alcohol and drugs. The fact that the legislature has criminalized driving under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol indicates a legislative intent to treat a single act of driving under the influence of multiple substances as a single offense. In fact, this Court has recognized that "it is well-settled that OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) establishes a single crime of driving while in a prohibited condition" and that the subsections "merely define different modes of committing that one crime." Morgan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 394, 395 (1) (442 SE2d 257) (1994).
As Taylor committed only one offense of driving under the influence , the trial court erred in subjecting him to multiple punishment. Hogan v. State, 178 Ga. App. 534 (343 SE2d 770) (1986). Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand only for re-sentencing.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. McMurray, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.
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