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Davis v. State5/4/1999
uestion him as long as he did not create the impression that Davis was not free to leave. See State v. Kaylor, 234 Ga. App. 495, 497 (507 SE2d 233) (1998). A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment does not occur simply because an officer approaches a person. See Burns v. State, 216 Ga. App. 178, 179 (454 SE2d 152) (1995). Thus, the officer was not required to have articulable suspicion to lawfully approach Davis. See Miller v. State, 221 Ga. App. 494, 495 (471 SE2d 565) (1996).
We note that the officer in this case made no attempt to detain Davis until after Davis began running. Flight may be evidence of consciousness of guilt and may give rise to an articulable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity, authorizing an officer to stop him briefly for investigation. Redd v. State, 229 Ga. App. 364, 366 (494 SE2d 31) (1997).
The cases cited by Davis as holding that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop are distinguishable. For example, in Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 545 (428 SE2d 440) (1993), the suspect turned into an apartment complex some 200 feet before a roadblock. Here, Davis turned onto a dirt road, upon which was only a chicken house, 20 to 25 yards before the roadblock. These facts made Davis' conduct more suspicious than Jorgensen's. Moreover, the officer in Jorgensen testified that he decided to stop the suspect as soon as he saw him turn into the complex and that the defendant was not free to leave. In this case, there was no such testimony; instead, the officer in this case simply followed and watched Davis, not approaching or attempting to stop him until he had more information.
The other cases cited by Davis, Streicher v. State, 213 Ga. App. 670 (445 SE2d 815) (1994), and State v. Jones, 214 Ga. App. 593 (448 SE2d 496) (1994), are inapposite because the officers in those cases, through flashing lights or other means, actually caused the defendants to stop their vehicles. See McClain at 717, fn. 3. As discussed above, Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to an officer's approach of a stopped car. See id. at 716. The trial court did not err in denying Davis' motion in limine. Judgment affirmed. Andrews and Ruffin, JJ., concur.
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