 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Deverney4/15/1999
r's admitted sympathy towards the defendants, the juror's acquaintance with Red Lake community members, some of whom were potential witnesses, the fact that the juror's wife was on probation for welfare fraud, and the juror's prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.
This list of reasons provided sufficient nonrace-based justifications for the strikes. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding that a prosecutor may exercise a peremptory challenge "`for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome' of the case to be tried") (citation omitted); see also State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. 1992) (upholding the use of a peremptory strike on a potential juror who answered, "probably, yeah," when asked whether she could follow the Judge's instruction).
Third, after the prosecutor has given a facially valid race-neutral explanation, then the trial court, considering all of the relevant evidence bearing on the issue, must determine whether the defendant has proven that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent or purpose. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362-66; see also State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn. 1995). If a prosecutor had a racially discriminatory intent or motive in striking a juror, a defendant is automatically entitled to a new trial because harmless error impact analysis is "inappropriate in the case of a defendant convicted by a petit jury if there was racial discrimination in the selection of that jury." McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 260.
If the basis for the challenge given by the prosecutor is one that will result in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, the trial court may consider the exclusion as one of the relevant circumstances bearing on the determination whether the facially valid reason given by the prosecutor is a pretextual explanation offered to mask a discriminatory intent. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. However, considerable deference must be given by a reviewing court to the trial court's finding on the issue of intent because the finding typically will turn largely on an evaluation by the trial court of credibility. See id. at 366-69.
The trial court, taking into consideration all the relevant factors, properly determined that DeVerney failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent or purpose, and we therefore affirm the trial court's ruling.
III.
DeVerney next argues that Mike Martin should not have been allowed to testify because his plea agreement exceeded the proper limits of inducements the state is allowed to offer in return for testimony. DeVerney's argument is based on his belief that, as part of the plea agreement, the trial court could reduce Martin's sentence depending on how well he testified. This argument is misplaced. The plea agreement states that Martin was only required to testify truthfully at each trial. The plea agreement does not indicate that the trial court would review the outcome of the cases in determining what sentence Martin would receive. Rather, it indicates that Martin agreed that, in exchange for his truthful testimony, he would receive a sentence ranging from 163 to 244½ months.
The decision to allow an accomplice to plead guilty to a lesser crime if the accomplice provides truthful information and testimony is a proper exercise of a prosecutor's authority. See State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 232 (Minn. 1986) (citing A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.9(b)(vi)). "Such negotiations do not necessarily make an accomplice's testimony so unreliable that it must be excluded from evidence, for they in no way bind the witnes
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Minnesota DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|