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State v. Greenleaf4/15/1999
m, asked a Carlton County officer to identify the offense Greenleaf would be charged with in Carlton County. The Carlton County officer informed Greenleaf and the Red Lake officer that the charge was second-degree murder and this information was then typed on the waiver form. Greenleaf, who later claimed he was intoxicated during this sequence of events, then signed the waiver form even though he had not yet spoken with an attorney and no warrant had been issued for his arrest. The Carlton County officers then left the Red Lake reservation.
Several hours later, a Red Lake officer again informed Greenleaf that he did not have to waive extradition and also informed him that he could, instead, appear in tribal court. Greenleaf again indicated that he wanted to waive extradition, stating that he wanted to return to Carlton County. Greenleaf then asked to talk to Carlton County authorities.
Carlton County officers were notified that Greenleaf had requested a meeting and returned to the Red Lake police station. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on September 1, 1996, the Carlton County officers once again read Greenleaf a Miranda warning. This time, Greenleaf waived his rights and admitted that he had been involved in Antonich's murder, describing in detail how it occurred and leading the officers to the site of the murder. Greenleaf told the officers that he was drunk and that, after the initial assault, he was ordered to participate by John Steven Martin.
On appeal, Greenleaf argues that the trial court made numerous errors and that he is entitled to a new trial. First, Greenleaf claims that his waiver of extradition was illegally obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and that his subsequent statements to police should be suppressed. Second, he claims that the waiver of extradition was invalid because there was no warrant for his arrest as required by tribal law. Third, he challenges the indictment and the grand jury proceedings. Fourth, he claims that it was improper to join his trial with the trial of DeVerney. Fifth, he claims that the trial court erred by allowing the state to use its peremptory strikes to remove two Native Americans from the jury pool, and by allowing DeVerney to use his peremptory strikes to remove several women from the jury pool. Sixth, he claims that the trial court erred by admitting Antoine Bellanger's out-of-court statement that, after returning to Duluth following Antonich's murder, Greenleaf held up his bloody fist and said he had "already beaten someone up that night." Seventh, he claims that the trial court erred by allowing several witnesses to testify directly from documents which were not admitted into evidence. Eighth, he argues that the trial court erred by not allowing expert testimony regarding his intoxication and duress defenses, and by not admitting reverse-Spriegl evidence of a crime John Steven Martin committed a year after Antonich's murder. Finally Greenleaf argues that the cumulative effect of numerous other errors requires that he be granted a new trial.
I.
We first address whether Greenleaf's waiver of extradition was illegally obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. If the waiver was illegally obtained, Greenleaf argues that his subsequent statements to police should have been suppressed. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda will not be admitted into evidence).
In Edwards v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that "an accused, * * * having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
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