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State v. Greenleaf4/15/1999
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). The Supreme Court has defined "interrogation" as "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
Greenleaf contends that his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated when a Red Lake officer asked if he wanted to waive extradition after Greenleaf had asked to speak with an attorney and before this request was granted. This argument fails for two reasons. First, asking Greenleaf whether he wanted to waive extradition was not an "interrogation" under Rhode Island v. Innis, because it is highly unlikely that asking someone whether they want to waive extradition would elicit an incriminating response. Such questions and comments are more analogous to routine booking questions and statements which do not require Miranda warnings. See State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1977) (holding that "Miranda warnings need not be given before asking routine booking questions"); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Minn. 1979) (holding that " iographical questions are not proscribed by Miranda"). Second, and more importantly, the statement Greenleaf now seeks to suppress was obtained only after Greenleaf requested to speak with Carlton County police, and only after he was given another Miranda warning and waived his rights. Greenleaf's argument that no warrant existed at the time he signed the extradition waiver is of no effect because even an illegal arrest in violation of an extradition treaty does not preclude criminal prosecution. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 656 (1992), Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
II.
We turn next to Greenleaf's argument that his conviction should be set aside and the indictment dismissed because of procedural and substantive irregularities in the grand jury proceedings.
A grand jury proceeding is not a trial on the merits and jurors do not determine guilt or innocence but determine if there is probable cause to believe the accused has committed a particular crime. See State v. Inthavong, 402 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1987). A presumption of regularity attaches to the indictment and it is a rare case where an indictment will be invalidated. See id. Because of this presumption, a criminal defendant bears a heavy burden when seeking to overturn an indictment. See State v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 717 (Minn. 1988). This burden is made even heavier when, as here, the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt following a fair trial. See id.
An indictment should be dismissed if the prosecutor knowingly engaged in misconduct that substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict and if a reviewing court gravely doubts that the decision to indict was free of any influence of the misconduct. See State v. Montanaro, 463 N.W.2d 281, 281 (Minn. 1990); State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 104-05 (Minn. 1989) (stating that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury will require dismissal of the indictment if the evidence would have materially affected the grand jury proceeding). The effect of the prosecutor's misconduct on the grand jury proceedings must be Judged after looking at all of the evidence received by the grand jury. See State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 106 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981).
Greenleaf asserts that five procedural irregularities or subst
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