 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Greenleaf4/15/1999
are jointly charged with a felony, they may be tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the court. In making its determination on whether to order joinder or separate trials, the court shall consider the nature of the offense charged, the impact on the victim, the potential prejudice to the defendant, and the interests of Justice." (Emphasis added).
The nature of the crime involved here is identical, as is the involvement of Greenleaf and DeVerney. Neither pulled the trigger, but both admitted almost identical roles in the assault, kidnap and murder, and in the attempt to hide any evidence that would link them to the crime. We have held that joinder is proper when two defendants act in close concert with one another. See Strimling, 265 N.W.2d at 432. The identical nature of the charged offenses and the nearly identical evidence against each defendant supports the trial court's decision to join Greenleaf and DeVerney for trial. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury at the beginning and end of the trial that the cases were to be considered separately and that evidence regarding DeVerney's prior crimes and correspondence with Aubid was to be considered only as to DeVerney. See State v. James, 520 N.W.2d 399, 405 (Minn. 1994) (holding that if the evidence and the instruction are neither complex nor confusing, it must be presumed that the jury understood and followed the court's instruction). The trial court also properly redacted from each co-defendant's statements any reference to the other co-defendant. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 3(2).
Greenleaf has also failed to establish that he suffered substantial prejudice, suggesting only that each defendant chose a different defense: Greenleaf claimed intoxication, duress, and that he was innocent, while DeVerney simply claimed he was innocent. However, these defenses did not conflict and the jury was not forced to choose between the testimony of DeVerney or the testimony of Greenleaf to arrive at its verdicts. Instead, the jury was asked to choose between the state's theory of the case and each defendant's theory of the case. Therefore, Greenleaf did not suffer substantial prejudice when it ordered a joint trial. See Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d at 503 (stating that no substantial prejudice occurred where defendants did not present inconsistent defense theories and did not seek to shift blame to the other).
In addition, joint trials were clearly in the interests of Justice because a majority of the prospective witnesses scheduled to appear in these cases lived in northeastern Minnesota and would have been required to drive two to four hours to testify in each trial. Therefore, we conclude that Greenleaf did not suffer substantial prejudice when the trial court ordered a joint trial.
IV.
We next consider Greenleaf's argument that the trial court erred by allowing the state to use its peremptory strikes to remove two Native Americans from the venire, and by allowing DeVerney to use his peremptory strikes to remove several women from the venire. The use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from the jury solely on the basis of either race or gender is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (prohibiting peremptory challenges based solely on race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (extending the prohibition in Batson to include peremptory challenges based solely on gender).
In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-step process to determine whether a peremptory challenge is motivated by a prohibited discriminatory intent. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79. First, the defendant
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Minnesota DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|