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State v. Greenleaf4/15/1999
ot prohibit Greenleaf from cross-examining Martin regarding every other aspect of the plea agreement, including the percentages by which Martin's sentence could be reduced. As the Supreme Court held in Kentucky v. Stincer, "the Confrontation Clause guarantees only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). The trial court was properly concerned that a recitation of the number of months of confinement Martin could serve might mislead the jury regarding the number of months another defendant, if convicted, might be confined. It is for the court to sentence, and not the jury, and thus the court, by allowing the jury to only know the percentages of the plea agreement, properly prevented the jury from speculating about possible sentences. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Greenleaf's counsel the right to cross-examine Martin regarding the specific number of months Martin's sentence could be reduced pursuant to plea agreement.
VI.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred by allowing an investigator to testify regarding the out-of-court statement of Antoine Bellanger. According to the investigator, Bellanger, who failed to appear to testify at trial after being served with a subpoena, saw Greenleaf at Bellanger's sister's house on August 28, 1996, the night of Antonich's murder. While there, Bellanger witnessed a confrontation between John Steven Martin and two men he did not know. During this confrontation, Greenleaf held up his bloody fist and said that he had "already beaten up somebody that night." The investigator also testified that Bellanger saw Greenleaf the next morning with the other four defendants and that they all stopped talking when Bellanger entered the room.
Out-of-court statements are inadmissible unless they qualify under an exception to or exclusion from the hearsay rule. See Minn. R. Evid. 804. Such statements are also inadmissible if the constitutional confrontational rights of the accused are violated. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1981). In determining whether an accused's confrontational rights have been violated, we apply the two-step analysis suggested by the Supreme Court in Roberts. See Hanson, 312 N.W.2d at 102. Under this analysis, the trial court must first address the necessity of the admission of the hearsay declaration. See id. This requirement can be met by showing the declarant is unavailable to testify at the trial. See Minn. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). In this case, Bellanger was unavailable because he failed to appear and could not through reasonable means be made to appear. See id.
The second requirement is that the statements bear sufficient "indicia of reliability." See Hanson, 312 N.W.2d at 102. Statements which are made under oath and subject to cross-examination may be sufficiently reliable to protect the values associated with the confrontation clause. See, e. g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-72; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). However, unsworn, ex parte statements made during police questioning have traditionally been considered inherently untrustworthy. See United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1981). Indeed, the purpose of the confrontation clause is to prohibit these ex parte declarations from being introduced at trial. See Green, 399 U.S. at 156; State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Minn. 1980) (stating that because of their unreliability, the admission of such statements may result in a denial of a defendant's constitution
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