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Jennings v. Director of Revenue4/6/1999
This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.
Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
Appeal From: Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Hon. Stephen K. Griffin
Citation:
Opinion Vote: REVERSED. Smith and Riederer, JJ., concur.
Opinion:
The Department of Revenue's director challenges the circuit court's Conclusion that a police officer becomes merely a private citizen when he arrests a driver for driving while intoxicated outside his jurisdiction's limits. The director appeals the circuit court's judgment setting aside the director's suspension of Larry Max Jennings' driving license for driving while intoxicated. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and order reinstatement of the director's decision to suspend Jennings' license.
The director suspended Jennings' license after a breath test administered by Cameron police on March 24, 1997, indicated that his blood alcohol concentration was .148 percent. Officer Rick Bashor arrested Jennings on I-35 about 100 yards beyond Cameron's city limits. Bashor had followed Jennings' pickup from Cameron and saw the pickup cross the center line and "fog line" (the solid white line marking the right side of the road) on U.S. 36 inside the city limits. While the pickup was still inside Cameron city limits, Bashor saw the pickup enter I-35 into the path of an oncoming tractor-trailer rig, nearly causing a collision. Still inside city limits, Bashor turned on his emergency lights to stop the pickup. More than a half-mile later, about 100 yards outside city limits, Jennings parked his pickup in response to Bashor's emergency lights. Bashor arrested Jennings for violating a Cameron city ordinance which prohibited a driver from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
The circuit court explained its reason for setting aside the judgment:
The Court finds that the arresting officer in this case was not proven to have "fresh pursuit" authority, as [the director] elicited no evidence to the requisite election under Section 544.157(4), RSMo. As the evidence clearly indicated that the officer was beyond his territorial boundaries, the Court finds that the officer could only be considered a private citizen in this proceeding. As such, private citizens may arrest on showing of commission of felony, to prevent affray of breach of the peace, and for misdemeanor, if authorized by statute; however, private citizens do not have the right or privilege to stop and detain persons believed to have committed ordinance violations or traffic offenses. Therefore, the Court finds that [the director] has failed in it's burden of proof that the arresting offer was a "law enforcement officer" under Section 302.500, RSMo., et seq.
The circuit court erred. Because this is not a criminal case, but an administrative law case, none of the issues considered by the circuit court were applicable.
The General Assembly has set out in Chapter 302 the procedures for suspension of a driving license in cases in which proper tests indicate that the driver of a motor vehicle has a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more. In section 302.510.1, the General Assembly has said:
Except as provided in subsection 3 of this section, a law enforcement officer who arrests any person . . . for a violation of a . . . municipal ordinance prohibiting driving while intoxicated . . . or municipal alcohol related traffic offense, and in which the alcohol concentration in the person's blood, breath, or urine was ten-hundredths of one percent or more by weight . . . shall forward to the department [of rev
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