 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Frazier v. State4/6/1999
after he was struck, apparently trying to suggest that the bicycle rider may have been partially to blame for the accident.
. Even the oral statement by the trial court quoted above that failed to specifically mention "negligent injury" nevertheless made reference to the indictment itself, which contained an unequivocal allegation that Frazier's negligent operation of the vehicle caused serious injury to another.
. The written judgment entered pursuant to that guilty plea does, admittedly, fail to describe with appropriate certainty the particular crime for which Frazier was being sentenced. Rather than reaching a Conclusion that this is proof that Frazier intended to plead guilty to a lesser crime, we are firmly of the opinion that the imprecise recitation of the crime in the sentencing order represents an unintentional drafting error that in no way prejudiced Frazier and is the sort of error which may be corrected at any time. Williams v. State, 583 So. 2d 620, 625 (Miss. 1991).
. We, therefore, find Frazier's appeal to be without merit insofar as he claims that his sentence exceeded the maximum punishment for the crime to which he entered a guilty plea.
. Despite our failure to find error in the length of Frazier's sentence, we remand this case to the trial level for the limited purpose of permitting the trial court to enter an amended sentencing order that more properly sets out the specific crime to which Frazier entered a plea of guilty, said order to be entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the earlier sentencing order.
. We purposely leave unanswered the question of whether our decision to reach the merits of Frazier's challenge to his sentence bars his right to seek further post-conviction relief due to the statute's restrictions on repetitive filings. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 1998). On the one hand, the Post-Conviction Relief Act specifically provides relief after a guilty plea for a prisoner who contends " hat the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(d) (Supp. 1998). On the other, the Goss decision makes no specific mention that it was treating Goss's motion to vacate his sentence as a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. We, thus, find that issue to be an open question and not one that must be answered to properly resolve this appeal.
. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANCOCK COUNTY IS AFFIRMED AS TO THE CLAIM OF THE APPELLANT THAT THE SENTENCE EXCEEDED THE MAXIMUM PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME. THE APPEAL BASED ON A CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE TRIAL LEVEL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. THIS CAUSE IS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PERMITTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTER A CORRECTED SENTENCING ORDER, NUNC PRO TUNC TO THE DATE OF THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING ORDER, TO MORE FULLY SET FORTH THE SPECIFIC CRIME UPON WHICH THE APPELLANT ENTERED HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HANCOCK COUNTY.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, COLEMAN, DIAZ, IRVING, LEE, PAYNE, JJ., CONCUR. THOMAS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
|