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State v. Cuny6/25/1999
erritorial limits of his or her primary jurisdiction in the following cases:"
". . . Any such law enforcement officer, if in a fresh attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, may follow such person anywhere in an area within twenty-five miles of the boundaries of the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction and there arrest and detain such person and return such person to the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction."
[4,5] Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent Conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. State v. Torres, 256 Neb. 380, 590 N.W.2d 184 (1999); State v. Woods, 255 Neb. 755, 587 N.W.2d 122 (1998). It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. State v. Woods, supra.
[6-8] Section 29-215 does give certain extra-jurisdictional arrest powers to certain law enforcement officers. However, we conclude that § 29-215 only applies to Nebraska law enforcement officers and does not apply to law enforcement officers who cross state lines. This Conclusion is supported by the language of § 29-215(1):
"Every sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, police officer, or peace officer as defined in subdivision (15) of section 49-801 shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state and of the political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his or her primary jurisdiction. Primary jurisdiction shall mean the geographic area within territorial limits of the state or political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer." (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, we hold that § 29-215 does not authorize an out-of-state police officer to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor DUI inside Nebraska. The Pine Ridge police officers did not have the authority to pursue and arrest Cuny for a misdemeanor offense in Nebraska. As such, their stop and detainment, or arrest, of Cuny was unlawful.
Having concluded that the actions of the Pine Ridge police officers were unlawful, we find the evidence obtained by Robbins was the fruit of an illegal search or seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, is inadmissible in a state prosecution, and must be excluded. See State v. Tingle, 239 Neb. 558, 477 N.W.2d 544 (1991), citing State v. O'Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 956, 84 S. Ct. 978, 11 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1964). After concluding that the Pine Ridge police officers were without authority to make the stop and arrest, we hold that Cuny's arrest was unlawful and that the trial court was clearly wrong in not suppressing all evidence obtained pursuant to the illegal actions.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Pine Ridge police officers did not have the authority to arrest Cuny, and therefore, such actions were unlawful. For the foregoing reasons, Cuny's arrest was illegal, and all evidence obtained pursuant to the illegal arrest should have been suppressed. We reverse, and dismiss.
Reversed and dismissed.
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