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State v. Turner6/16/1999
In 1996, the defendant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), second offense. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration, all but fifty-five days suspended, with the balance to be served on probation. He now presents several arguments why enhancement to second-offense DUI was improper. After a review of the record, we affirm.
To enhance the defendant's DUI conviction to second-offense DUI, the State relied upon a 1990 conviction for DUI. The defendant sought to have the 1990 conviction declared void as an enhancement factor on the basis that the record did not reflect strict compliance with statutory provisions regarding the election of the special Judge who accepted the guilty plea that led to the conviction. The trial court denied the defendant's motion.
During that portion of the defendant's trial relating to whether his DUI offense was a second offense, the State introduced into evidence a copy of the judgment from the 1990 conviction. The 1990 judgment reflected that the defendant in that case, "Mark Turner," pled guilty to first-offense DUI and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration, with all but forty-eight hours suspended. The copy of this judgment is not certified and the only stamp reflected on it is one dated March 4, 1997, which is the date the appellate record was prepared.
The State also introduced into evidence a copy of the arrest warrant underlying the 1990 conviction, a copy of the arrest warrant in the present case, and the testimony of a Davidson County probate court clerk. Through the clerk's testimony, the State compared the arrestee's personal information and physical characteristics listed on the arrest warrant from the 1990 DUI conviction with those on the arrest warrant in this case in an effort to prove that the offender in both cases was the defendant. In so doing, the clerk testified that both arrest warrants reflected that the arrestee was a 5'11" white male named Mark John Turner and born October 29, 1958. She testified that the arrest warrant in the present case reflected the defendant weighed 170 pounds and had hazel eyes and brown hair, while the prior arrest warrant reflected the arrestee weighed 160 pounds and had green eyes. When asked what color of hair the prior arrest warrant reflected, the clerk noted that the abbreviation "BL" was used and explained that notation could mean either black or blond hair. The residential addresses listed on the two arrest warrants were different.
First, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the notations of physical characteristics listed on the prior arrest warrant for the purpose of proving identity, that is, that the defendant was the same person arrested for and ultimately convicted of DUI in 1990. He argues that the admission of this evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and violated the hearsay rule as stated in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(8).
This Court has held that the admission of court records into evidence for the purpose of proving habitual offender status does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to confront his or her accusers. State v. Miller, 608 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). A defendant does not have the right to re-examine witnesses from proceedings relating to prior offenses because he or she had the right to confront them during the prior proceedings. Id. at 161 (citing People v. Bryan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 291, 303 (Ct. App. 1970)). This reasoning is applicable here. Thus, the defendant's constitutional challenge to the admission of the prior arrest warran
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