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State v. Swords4/14/1999
thorized routes of attack." Id. at 272. We decline to hold the rule announced in McClintock unconstitutional following institution of a statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions, as Defendant requests that this Court hold.
The McClintock court indicated the meaning of facial invalidity in its Conclusion based upon the facts of that case:
" he present proceeding in the case sub judice, a direct appeal of Defendant's most recent conviction, is not the forum in which Defendant's Constitutional claims may be raised because nothing on the face of the record "discloses any want of authority to pronounce that judgment. Hence, collateral attack not permissible." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bomar v. State ex rel. Stewart, 300 S.W.2d 885, 887-88 (Tenn. 1957)). In addition, this Court examined "whether judgment is void on its face and thus subject to collateral attack," in State v. Gross, 673 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). In that case, we concluded,
"The record shows the appellee, represented by counsel, appeared before the general session court. He and his attorney signed a waiver of indictment, presentment, etc., and the appellee entered a plea of guilty to the charge of DUI. . . . The General Sessions Court of Sullivan County had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge and it had personal jurisdiction of this appellee." Id. at 553-54. Furthermore, in State v. Gallaher, 730 S.W.2d 622 (Tenn. 1987), our supreme court held a conviction facially valid where
" he record shows on its face that [the defendant] executed waivers to the effect that she was fully advised of her rights and expressly advised of her right to the aid of counsel at every stage of the proceeding and if necessary an attorney would be appointed to represent her; that she expressly waived her right to counsel, to a preliminary hearing, to a grand jury indictment, and a trial by jury." Id. at 623.
Likewise, we find nothing on the face of the records that discloses any invalidity to the guilty-plea convictions for DUI in 1989 and 1992. See Maurice Wilson v. State, No. 01C01-9310-CR-00352, 1994 WL 151322, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 28, 1994) ("[The defendant's] claims of an involuntary guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel, while they might serve to void the judgment, do not make it facially void."). Therefore, we conclude that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act is the authorized potential route of attack for Defendant.
We conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief in this Court based upon the asserted violations of due process, and that he is not entitled to attack the validity of his prior DUI convictions to prevent them from enhancing his current sentence for third-offense DUI. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
L.T. LAFFERTY, SPECIAL JUDGE
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