State v. Frazier3/31/1999
The State appeals the dismissal of an indictment by the Davidson County Probate Court. The trial court found that the prosecution's delay following indictment violated the appellee's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court committed error by failing to consider factors relevant to a speedy trial claim.
After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the indictment.
BACKGROUND
The appellee, James G. Frazier, was arrested on February 10, 1996, for driving under the influence . This charge was dismissed in General Sessions Court on June 12, 1996. On December 4, 1996, the State presented this case to a Davidson County grand jury. A true bill for DUI was returned and the appellee was subsequently arrested for this offense on January 25, 1998. Following the appellee's arraignment for DUI in Probate Court, a motion to dismiss alleging denial of a speedy trial was filed on March 12, 1998. The proof at the scheduled hearing on the motion established that the appellee's address, telephone number and employment had not changed since his DUI arrest in February of 1996. The appellee admitted that he had conducted no pre-trial investigation following his initial charge for DUI. Also, he was unaware of any witness who was lost or unavailable or any evidence that had been destroyed. Moreover, the appellee testified that the indictment had not caused him any mental anguish or loss of sleep at night.
"At the Conclusion of the proof, the trial court found that: o efforts were made by the authorities to notify him [appellee] of the action of the Grand Jury that and indictment was returned. The defendant did not attempt to prove any prejudice resulting from the delay . . . [i.e.,] no witnesses had been lost, his memory had not dimmed, and . . . had not suffered any mental anguish. . . . Therefore, the Court finds no specific factual prejudice to the defendant from the delay. . . ."
In dismissing the indictment, the trial court acknowledged that generally a showing of prejudice is required upon a speedy trial violation, " owever, the Court is concerned that for a period of years it is clear that sealed indictments are not served nor are any attempts made for their service unless and until the defendant is stopped at a later date."
ANALYSIS
Before embarking upon an examination of the appellee's speedy trial claim, it is first necessary to establish the starting point of his right to a speedy trial. The right attaches at the time of the actual arrest or formal grand jury action, whichever occurs first, and continues until the date of trial. State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tenn. 1997); see e.g., United States v. Loudhawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310-312, 102 S.Ct. 648, 653-654 (1986); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971). This right, however, does not apply during time periods when charges have been dismissed. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8-9, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502 (1982). In this case, because the indictment occurred before the appellee's arrest in January of 1998, the starting point for delay is the date of the indictment, December 4, 1996.
When a defendant contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, the reviewing court must conduct a four part balancing test to determine if this right was, indeed, abridged. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972). This test includes consideration of (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the actual prejudice suffered by the defendant because of the delay. Id.; see also State
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