 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Sneed5/5/1999
The defendant, Robert M. Sneed, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Sullivan County Criminal Court declaring him to be a habitual motor vehicle offender, thereby barring him from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of Tennessee. He raises various issues dealing with (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of the predicate convictions, (2) the constitutionality of the convicting, sentencing, and Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) proceedings, particularly regarding due process and double jeopardy, and (3) the failure of the trial court to appoint him counsel for this appeal. We affirm the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court declaring the defendant to be a habitual motor vehicle offender was entered on July 25, 1997. The trial court based this conviction upon the following predicate convictions regarding driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and driving with a revoked license (DRL):
"OFFENSE COURT CONVICTION DATE"
"DRL Sullivan County General Sessions CourtMarch 23, 1995"
"DUI Sullivan County Criminal CourtMay 10, 1996"
"DUI Sullivan County General Sessions CourtOctober 1, 1996"
As a starting point, we note certain propositions of law that dispose of many of the defendant's contentions. An MVHO proceeding is civil in nature, not criminal . See Everhart v. State, 563 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). It involves revocation of the privilege of driving, not the deprivation of a property right. Id. It is remedial in nature and does not constitute multiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause relative to the prior convictions upon which the proceeding is based. See State v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Malady, 952 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Also, the defendant may not collaterally attack predicate convictions during amn MVHO proceeding. See Everhart, 563 S.W.2d at 797-98. Under these principles, any complaint about the constitutional validity of the predicate convictions or of the MVHO process must fail. Similarly, given the civil nature of the proceeding, the defendant has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Likewise, no such statutory right exists.
The remaining issue is whether sufficient predicate convictions existed to justify the defendant being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender. On this point, the defendant asserts that the DUI conviction of May 10, 1996, was not final because it was on appeal to this court when the trial court entered the MVHO judgment. The record bears this out, even though the defendant has failed to make the transcript of the MVHO hearing a part of the record on appeal. We take judicial notice of the fact that the case was on appeal at the time of the trial court hearing. See State v. Robert M. Sneed, No. 03C01-9610-CR-00371, Sullivan County (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1997).
The defendant notes that the MVHO act defines a conviction for its purposes as a "final conviction." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(1). He asserts that this means that a conviction that is on appeal may not be used as a predicate conviction in an MMVHO proceeding.
In response, the state relies upon State v. Loden, 920 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), a driving on a revoked license case. In Loden, the defendant claimed that because the DUI conviction that led to license revocation was still on appeal, the revocation was not effective at the time that he was charged with DRL. He relied upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-501, which requires the department of safety to revoke a license upon receipt of a record of a conviction for certain offenses, including DUI, "when such conviction has beco
Page 1 2 Tennessee DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|