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Houston v. Commonwealth11/5/2004
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from the March 18, 2004, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County (trial court), which sustained the appeal of Clyde J. Houston, Jr. (Licensee) with respect to the ignition interlock sanctions imposed on him by DOT. We affirm.
Licensee was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) in 1987 and was placed on Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD). Licensee was arrested again for DUI in 1989 and 1997 and received sentences in connection with those offenses. (Trial ct. op. at 2.)
On September 30, 2000, the act commonly known as the Ignition Interlock Law (Law) became effective.*fn1 Section 7002 of the Law stated that, where a person has been convicted for a second or subsequent DUI offense, the court shall order the installation of an approved ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned by the person.
On November 27, 2002, Licensee was arrested again for DUI, and, on May 6, 2003, he received a sentence for that offense. DOT sent Licensee a Notice of Suspension dated August 21, 2003, informing him that his driving privileges were suspended for one year as a result of his conviction for DUI. The notice also informed Licensee that his driving privileges would not be restored after the expiration of the one-year period unless he installed ignition interlock devices in each of the vehicles he owns. (Trial ct. op. at 3.)
Licensee appealed the ignition interlock requirement, arguing that he had not been convicted of a second or subsequent DUI offense since the effective date of the Law. In making his argument, Licensee relied on this court's holding in Alexander v. Commonwealth, 822 A.2d 92 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (holding that the Law may not be applied retroactively by considering DUI convictions that occurred before the effective date of the Law), appeal granted, ___ Pa. ___, 849 A.2d 1129 (2004). Following Alexander, the trial court sustained Licensee's appeal. DOT now appeals to this court.*fn2
DOT asks this court to overrule Alexander. However, we decline to do so here. Moreover, even if we were to agree that Alexander was wrongly decided, we still would affirm the trial court. Indeed, even if DOT could have considered Licensee's DUI offenses in 1987, 1989 and 1997, DOT simply had no power to require Licensee to install ignition interlock devices on his vehicles. This is now well-settled, and, in fact, DOT conceded as much in Delaney v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 849 A.2d 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), referring to our supreme court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 575 Pa. 5, 834 A.2d 488 (2003) (severing section 7002 from the Law as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine).*fn3
Because DOT lacked power to require Licensee to install ignition interlock devices on his vehicles and because we decline to overrule Alexander, we affirm.
AND NOW, this 5th day of November, 2004, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, dated March 18, 2004, is hereby affirmed.
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