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McKeown v. Commonwealth12/7/2004
Edmund F. McKeown (Licensee) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) denying his statutory appeal of a one-year suspension of his driver's license. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) suspended Licensee's operating privileges after his conviction of violating the New Jersey statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated (DWI).*fn1 It was Licensee's first offense. The license suspension was imposed in accordance with 75 Pa. C.S. §§1532 (b)(3)*fn2 and 1581, Article IV.*fn3 For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
On January 9, 2003, Licensee was charged with DWI in the State of New Jersey, and he was convicted on July 9, 2003. New Jersey is a party to the Driver License Compact of 1961. See N.J.S.A. §§39:5D-1 - 39:5D-3. Pursuant to Article III of the Compact, the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles reported Licensee's conviction to the Department. On November 21, 2003, the Department notified Licensee that his operating privilege was suspended for one year, as required by 75 Pa.C.S. §§1532(b)(3) and 1581, Article IV. On December 19, 2003, Licensee filed a timely statutory appeal of that suspension.
At the de novo hearing before the trial court on March 19, 2004, Licensee argued that his license suspension violated equal protection. The Act of September 30, 2003, P.L. 120, No. 24 (Act 2003-24),*fn4 reduced the civil sanction for a first time DWI conviction; it does not require the Department to impose a one-year suspension of driving privileges as a result of this conviction.*fn5 Licensee contended that it would violate equal protection were his license to be suspended simply because his conviction occurred before the effective date of the Act 2003-24. The trial court concluded that the amendments to 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3804, effective February 1, 2004, have no applicability to a New Jersey conviction occurring on July 9, 2003, nor a Notice of Suspension dated November 21, 2003, and ... that the Commonwealth has met the due process requirements articulated by our Supreme Court in Harrington v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 763 A.2d 386 (2000).
Order of April 15, 2004. The trial court dismissed Licensee's appeal, and Licensee appealed to this Court.
On appeal,*fn6 Licensee raises one issue. Licensee asserts that he has been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Pa. Const., Art. 1, §§1, 26. He argues that Act 2003-24 has established disparate treatment of similarly situated persons as of its effective date of February 1, 2004. He explains that those convicted of an out-of-state DWI before the effective date of Act 2003-24 are subject to a license suspension, but those convicted of the same offense after that date are not so burdened. To highlight his claim of disparate treatment, Licensee offers the following hypothetical: Assume two Pennsylvania drivers are arrested for a first time DWI offense on the same day, prior to the effective date of Act 2003-04. Driver No. 1 is convicted on January 31, 2004, and his license is suspended; Driver No. 2 is convicted on February 1, 2004, and he keeps his license. Indeed, Licensee postulates that a driver convicted of a DWI prior to February 1, 2004, could withdraw his guilty plea and enter a new plea after February 1 to "reap the benefits of the new law." Licensee's Brief at 11.
The Department counters that Licensee misreprehends the change in the law. The General Assembly included a number of "savings provisions" that dealt with violations of statutory provisions occurring prior to the February 1, 2004, the effective date of Chapte
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