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State v. Stenson6/24/1999
: Yes.
At trial, defendant appeared pro se and was convicted of driving under the influence .
A defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important that it requires special protection of knowing and intelligent waiver standard). This requires the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the nature of a defendant's understanding of the rights he is waiving. The trial court should seek to uncover a defendant's "experience, motives, and understanding of what he is undertaking" and provide "a clear explanation of the adverse consequences of pro se representation." State v. Merrill, 155 Vt. 422, 425, 584 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1990).
The above cases, however, deal with situations where there is a valid question about whether a defendant understood that there was a right to counsel. This was not the situation faced by the court in the instant case. Defendant demonstrated that he knew he had a right to counsel and he expressed his desire to be represented by an attorney, but was unwilling to pay for it. Thus, it was not a situation where the court needed to provide the defendant with a lengthy and detailed explanation of his rights or to carefully probe his understanding. See id. at 425-26, 584 A.2d at 1131 (while some defendants may need more thorough explanation of trade-offs in order to understand consequences of waiver, other defendants may indicate through their statements and conduct that "in-depth inquiry or extensive advice is not necessary in that particular case to protect the constitutional rights of the unrepresented defendant").
In assessing whether defendant executed a valid waiver, we look to the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 427, 584 A.2d 1132. In this case, defendant attempted twice to obtain a public defender, successfully obtained private counsel (until counsel withdrew due to defendant's failure to make a scheduled court appearance), and received the benefit of the trial court's explanation of his right to counsel. Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, defendant's wife explained that defendant felt that "with legal representation . . . he might have been able to challenge what had happened, but that defendant "chose to uphold our commitment to the bank instead of getting a lawyer for the trial." Defendant's actions indicated that he wanted counsel and understood his right to counsel, but made a conscious choice based on his financial situation to represent himself. No further explanation by the court would have changed this situation.
The fact that the trial court refused to grant a continuance to allow defendant to obtain counsel is immaterial to the assessment of defendant's waiver in this case. The denial of a motion to continue will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Hicks, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 711 A.2d 660, 662 (1998) (mem). Here, defendant manifested a general disregard for the court process and the trial court concluded that defendant did not make a serious effort to obtain counsel, despite the fact that he had the time and ability to do so. There was therefore no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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