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SAKEAGAK v. STATE1/9/1998
ive than prejudicial. Sakeagak has failed to convince us that this ruling was an abuse of discretion.
The Sentencing Issues
We now turn to Sakeagak's sentencing issues. Sakeagak was found guilty of first-degree murder. The presumptive sentencing laws do not apply to first-degree murder; a sentencing judge has the authority to impose any sentence within the range of imprisonment for this offense (20 years to 99 years). AS 12.55.125(a). However, even though the aggravating and mitigating factors codified in AS 12.55.155(c) and (d) do not apply to first-degree murder, the parties used these factors as points of reference at Sakeagak's sentencing when they argued how Sakeagak's offense should be viewed in comparison to a typical first-degree murder. We have approved this practice in similar circumstances. See Gregory v. State, 689 P.2d 508, 509 (Alaska App. 1984) (approving a judge's consideration of the statutory aggravators and mitigators in a second-degree murder sentencing).
The State argued that Sakeagak's offense should be deemed more than typically serious because Sakeagak knew that Judy Sakeagak was quite intoxicated at the time of her death, and thus particularly vulnerable to Sakeagak's assault. (Judy's blood-alcohol level at the time of her death was .249 percent.) See AS 12.55.155(c)(5), which declares that an offense is aggravated if "the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, disability, ill health, or extreme youth[,] or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental powers of resistance". Judge Jeffery agreed with the State that this factor was present in Sakeagak's case.
Sakeagak argues that aggravator (c)(5) does not apply to victims who are rendered particularly vulnerable by intoxication. He relies on AS 12.55.155(g), which declares, "Voluntary alcohol or other drug intoxication . . . may not be considered an aggravating or mitigating factor." When Sakeagak presented this argument to Judge Jeffery, the judge concluded that AS 12.55.155(g) was intended to bar a sentencing judge from finding aggravators or mitigators based on the defendant's intoxication, but that AS 12.55.155(g) was not intended to bar a judge from considering a victim's intoxication when determining the disabilities described in AS 12.55.155(c)(5). We agree.
While the wording of AS 12.55.155(g), considered by itself, might support Sakeagak's argument, we must interpret the various parts of AS 12.55.155 as a whole. The guiding principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and implement the intent of the legislature. When a statutory provision is part of a larger framework, even seemingly unambiguous language must be interpreted in the context of the other portions of the statute. Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992).
AS 12.55.155(c)(5) authorizes increased sentences for defendants whose victims are "for any . . . reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental powers of resistance". The statute specifically mentions victims whose incapacity is due to ill health, and this court has interpreted the statute to apply to victims who are substantially incapable of resistance because they are asleep. See Wassillie v. State, 911 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Alaska App. 1996). Given the obvious legislative policy behind aggravator (c)(5), it is simply unreasonable to interpret aggravator (c)(5) as not authorizing increased sentences for defendants whose victims are substantially incapacitated by intoxication. Sakeagak offers no plausible reason why the legislature might have wanted to
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