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SAKEAGAK v. STATE1/9/1998 limit the scope of aggravator (c)(5) in the manner he suggests.
Sakeagak's final contention is that his 99-year sentence is excessive. This is the maximum sentence for first-degree murder, and Sakeagak relies on cases holding that "maximum sentences . . . should not be imposed without some foundation for characterizing a defendant as the worst type of offender." State v. Wortham, 537 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1975), quoting Galaktionoff v. State, 486 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1971).
However, a finding that a defendant is a "worst offender" can be based on the nature and circumstances of the defendant's present offense, or on the defendant's criminal history, or both. Hintz v. State,
627 P.2d 207, 210 (Alaska 1981); Moore v. State, 597 P.2d 975, 976 n. 4 (Alaska 1979); Saganna v. State, 594 P.2d 69, 70 (Alaska 1979). This court's decision in Riley v. State, 720 P.2d 951 (Alaska App. 1986), strongly suggests that a defendant who commits first-degree murder is often, by virtue of the crime alone, properly categorized as a "worst offender". In Riley, this court rejected a proposed 60-year benchmark sentence for first-degree murder — primarily because 99-year sentences for first-degree murder have consistently been upheld by the Alaska appellate courts. Id., 720 P.2d at 952.
Riley does not establish the rule that first-degree murderers can always receive 99-year sentences, nor does Riley free sentencing judges from the obligation to base sentences on a careful consideration of the Chaney sentencing criteria. See Riley, 720 P.2d at 952; State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970); AS 12.55.005. However, after Riley, a defendant who challenges a 99-year sentence for first-degree murder must show some reason to believe that his offense is mitigated or that his background is atypically favorable.
Judge Jeffery found that Sakeagak's case presented three of the aggravating factors listed in AS 12.55.155(c): (c)(5) (that Sakeagak knew or reasonably should have known that his victim was particularly vulnerable), (c)(8) (that Sakeagak had a history of assaultive conduct), and (c)(18)(A) (that Sakeagak's crime was committed against a person living in the same household). The judge also noted that Sakeagak's murder of his wife had been the culmination of a "continuum of domestic violence". Sakeagak had a lengthy history of assaults upon his wife. Most of these assaults were not prosecuted, but one incident (in which Sakeagak slammed his wife's head against a door and then cut her arm with a hunting knife) led to Sakeagak's conviction in 1992 for fourth-degree assault.
Judge Jeffery concluded that, in fashioning Sakeagak's sentence, he needed to stress the community's condemnation of domestic violence. The judge concluded that Sakeagak had little insight into his criminal behavior and that there was a substantial danger that Sakeagak would resort to similar violence in any future relationship. Judge Jeffery also noted that Sakeagak had a serious and long-standing alcohol problem, a problem that Sakeagak had failed to address despite several past opportunities.
Sakeagak does not seriously dispute any of this. He does argue, however, that despite these aggravating circumstances there is "nothing in the record" to indicate that he intended to kill his wife when he assaulted her. The jury found otherwise; they convicted Sakeagak of first-degree murder, which requires a finding that Sakeagak intended to kill his wife. The record contains ample evidence to support this finding.
Sakeagak argues that his crime is less aggravated than some of the other first-degree murders that have been reviewed on appeal. This is true. However, as explai
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