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INGRAM v. STATE3/20/1998
st or that the appellant's arrest was not made with reasonable promptness, given the circumstances. See State v. Calanche, 91 N.M. 390, 393, 574 P.2d 1018, 1020 (App. 1978) (stating that when an officer arrives at an accident scene, the officer has two immediate concerns: care for the injured and traffic safety, and stating further, "only after action is underway to meet these immediate concerns can the officer undertake to investigate the accident. Yet, it is this investigation that provides the grounds for a warrantless arrest." under the statute.). Moreover, we believe that, under the facts of this case, the hospital emergency room could be considered an extension of the "scene of the accident." See Morrow v. State, 303 A.2d 633 (Del. 1973). Accordingly, we find that the appellant's warrantless arrest was valid under § 32-5-171. Because his arrest was valid, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge that arrest. The appellant has failed to satisfy Strickland's test for prevailing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to this issue.
The appellant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that evidence that he says was obtained as the result of an un-Mirandized statement made by the appellant at the hospital be suppressed by the trial court. The statement was in fact suppressed by the trial court. The appellant, however, does not point to any evidence obtained or admitted as a result of the un-Mirandized statement. Therefore, he has not shown how he was prejudiced by his counsel's actions. The appellant has failed to satisfy Strickland's test for prevailing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to this issue.
Finally, the appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the blood-alcohol test results on the ground that the person who drew the blood from him at the hospital lacked the qualifications to do so. Michael Schmitt, who drew the blood sample from the appellant, testified at trial that he was a medical laboratory technician at the Central Alabama Medical Center, that he had earned an associate's degree in medical technology, that he was licensed by the State of Tennessee as a medical technologist, and that he had approximately six years' experience in the field. Schmitt's testimony was sufficient to establish that he was a "qualified person" within the meaning of § 32-5A-194(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, to withdraw the appellant's blood for the purpose of having it tested for its alcohol content. See Powell v. State, 515 So.2d 140 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986). The appellant has offered no evidence to establish that Schmitt was not qualified under Alabama law to take the appellant's blood sample and has failed to satisfy Strickland's test for prevailing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
For the reasons set out above, we fnd that the trial court correctly denied the appellant relief on his allegations that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the appellant's Rule 32 petition. Also, for the reasons set out above, we dismiss the appellant's second out-of-time appeal, and we revoke the appellant's appeal bond.
SECOND OUT-OF-TIME APPEAL DISMISSED; APPEAL BOND REVOKED; DENIAL OF RULE 32 PETITION AFFIRMED.
All the Judges concur.
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