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Beatus v. Commonwealth3/20/1998
ing statutes is a matter of law. White v. McAllister, Ky., 443 S.W.2d 541, 542 (1969). The issue of whether penalties from KRS 189A.010 can be utilized in the context of a violation of KRS 281A.210 is strictly a matter of law based on statutory construction, entitling a reviewing court to exercise a lesser level of deference to the judgments of the McCracken courts.
After careful review, we agree with the McCracken Circuit Court's reasoning that the legislature enacted Chapter 281A in order to apply more stringent controls to the operators of commercial vehicles in light of the heightened likelihood of danger inherent in the improper operation of their vehicles. KRS 281A.020 sets forth among the chapter's purposes "reduc or prevent commercial vehicle accidents, fatalities and injuries." KRS 281A.020(2) states:
his chapter shall be liberally construed to promote public health, safety and welfare. As applied to commercial drivers, to the extent this chapter conflicts with general driver licensing provisions this chapter prevails. If this chapter is silent, general driver licensing provisions shall apply.
This Court also agrees with the McCracken Circuit Court that the state legislature intended that operators of commercial vehicles be considered "under the influence" if their blood alcohol level exceeded 0.04. However, we find that the McCracken Circuit Court erred in commingling these two statutory chapters by permitting the district court to elect to prosecute under one and penalize pursuant to the other.
While Beatus was initially arrested and charged pursuant to KRS 189A.010, the Commonwealth elected to amend the charge and to proceed to trial pursuant to KRS 281A.210. In so electing, it bound itself to invoke the penalty provision contained at that chapter and did not have the option of reaching into KRS Chapter 189A in order to enforce and punish a violation pursuant to KRS 281A.
Each statutory chapter is self-contained and complete; each reflects its own, distinct legislative purpose. The heightened, more stringent blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 contained at 281A.210 is a tougher standard than that applied to non-commercial drivers, implementing the legislative intent that drivers of huge commercial vehicles bear a heavier burden as to sobriety -- an objective commensurate with the potentially greater havoc they would wreak on the public if driving under the influence . The penalty provision of KRS 281A is tailored to satisfy and correlate with that legislative intent.
The General Assembly easily could have incorporated commercial and non-commercial drivers into one statutory scheme for the purpose of prosecuting and penalizing drinking/drunken drivers. In the alternative, it could have made specific reference to the separate penalty provisions in each chapter, announcing its intent that those provisions could be invoked and applied interchangeably. The legislative silence on this point reflects the clear and unambiguous legislative intent that these two chapters have two separate functions and create separate expectations of punishment in offenders.
We hold that it was error for the trial court to permit the Commonwealth to prosecute under KRS 281A and to seek to penalize under KRS 189A. Therefore, we reverse the McCracken Circuit Court and remand with directions that judgment be entered consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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