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State v. Harris2/20/1998
im; thus, he knew the weapon was loaded before he fired the second shot which killed the victim. The state also introduced the testimony of Mr. Churchman that the victim's wound was inflicted with the gun four to eight inches away from his face; in Benjamin Eckels' taped statement, he said that the gun was a foot or a little over a foot away. Benjamin's taped statement also established that the victim was sitting in a chair at the kitchen table when the defendant "hauled off and shot him in his head." In his statement, Benjamin said that the defendant aimed the gun above the victim's nose and reached across the table to shoot. According to the taped statement of Demetric Harris, the defendant shot the victim when he attempted to get up from his chair, after other testimony established that the defendant had asked the victim to leave the house. Additional testimony established that the victim was unarmed and that the defendant brought the victim to his home to pay him for work he had performed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude the state proved the essential elements of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Having found the elements of second degree murder, the jury had to determine whether or not the circumstances indicated that the crime was actually manslaughter. LSA-R.S. 14:31(A)(1) provides:
A. Manslaughter is:
(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]
The existence of "sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are not elements of the offense but, rather, are factors in the nature of mitigating circumstances which may reduce the grade of homicide. Provocation is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Thus, the issue remaining is whether or not any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigating factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Corchet, 96-1666 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97); 693 So.2d 1300.
In this case, while the defendant and the victim were arguing and drinking prior to the shooting, testimony established that they argued and drank daily. Considering these facts, a rational trier of fact might well have concluded that the defendant acted with deliberation and reflection and not in the heat of passion at the time of the shooting. The jury obviously concluded either: (1) that the argument between the defendant and the victim over money was not sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection; or (2) that an average person's blood would have cooled by the time the defendant shot the victim. See State v. Crochet, 96-1666, p. 11; 693 So.2d at 1307.
After a careful review of the record, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have concluded the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder, that the defendant was not so intoxicated so as to preclude the presence of specific intent, and that the mitigating factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court correc
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