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State v. Cilley2/18/1998
him"); United States v. Regan, 687 F.2d 531, 535 (1st Cir. 1982) (no seizure where police did not order defendant to halt and did not block his path, but merely asked to speak with him); Moulton, 1997 ME 228, 9, -- A.2d -- (no seizure where officer did not restrict defendant's ability to leave by blocking her parked car or activating his cruiser's blue lights, but merely approached the defendant to ask if she needed assistance); State v. Foster, 237 S.E.2d 589, 592 (S.C. 1977) (no stop where driver, without prompting by police, stopped car when he saw police following him).
Although the encounter in this case occurred on a rural woods road rather than on a more well-traveled, urban roadway, we see no reason to depart from the well-established constitutional principles reflected in these cases. We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in its ruling that the wardens stopped Cilley within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. III.
The State further argues that the court erred in determining that the wardens lacked probable cause to arrest Cilley for operating the ATV while under the influence of intoxicants. We review independently the court's legal Conclusion that the historical facts amounted to probable cause. See State v. Enggass, 571 A.2d 823, 824 (Me. 1990).
A person is guilty of OUI if his mental or physical faculties are impaired, however slightly or to any extent. See State v. Bradley, 658 A.2d 236, 237 (Me. 1995); State v. Bento, 600 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Me. 1991). "Under this standard, probable cause to believe a defendant was operating under the influence exists if there is reason to believe that his mental or physical faculties are impaired by the consumption of alcohol." Bradley, 658 A.2d at 237 (quoting Bento, 600 A.2d at 1096-97). The quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is less than the level of a fair preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 237-38 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) ("probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard . . . does not demand any showing that [the officer's] belief be correct or more likely true than false")).
Applying these principles to the undisputed factual findings of the court, we conclude that the wardens had probable cause to believe that Cilley was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants. Given the relatively low quantum of proof required to establish probable cause, see Bradley, 658 A.2d at 237-38, an ordinarily prudent and cautious officer could have concluded that Cilley's mental and physical faculties were impaired based on a combination of Cilley's admission to consuming "a couple of beers"; the smell of alcohol on his breath; his bloodshot eyes; his failure to recite the numbers in proper sequence and to touch his fingertips as instructed on the finger dexterity test; his failure to stand on one leg while counting to thirty as instructed; and Brown's personal knowledge of how Cilley has behaved in the past when intoxicated. See State v. Boylan, 665 A.2d 1016 (Me. 1995); Bradley, 658 A.2d 236. Viewed together, these facts constituted adequate indicia of Cilley's impairment, and the wardens had probable cause to arrest him for operating under the influence.
The entry is:
Order vacated; remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the decision herein.
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