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Justus v. State ex rel Department of Public Safety5/28/2002
On August 24, 2000, at about 3:00 a.m., Oklahoma City police officers arrested Justus in the Quail Ridge parking lot for driving under the influence of alcohol. Pursuant to Oklahoma's implied consent statute, 47 O.S. 2001 § 751, the officers asked Justus to submit to a chemical test. He refused. As a result, his driver's license was revoked. The Department of Public Safety (DPS), in an implied consent hearing, ruled that Justus had been arrested upon reasonable belief that he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on "the public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes or other public place of this state" while under the influence of alcohol, 47 O.S. 2001 §753, and that after being requested to submit to a chemical test and being informed that his driver's license would be revoked, Justus refused to submit to the test. DPS revoked his license and he appealed to the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to Justus, reversing DPS' revocation order. The district court found as a matter of law that the Quail Ridge parking lot is not a public parking lot for purposes of the implied consent statute. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed. We previously granted certiorari.
Appeals from implied consent revocation orders are heard de novo in the district court, both on the law and on the facts. In re Braddy, 1980 OK 44, 611 P.2d 235, 237-38. In this case, since the parties entered into stipulated facts at the district court level, the issue presented on certiorari is a pure question of the application of a statute to the undisputed facts. This presents a question of law that we review de novo. Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, 989 P.2d 448, 455. In a de novo review, we have plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to determine whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Id.
"The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent." TXO Production Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 1992 OK 39, 829 P.2d 964, 968-69. "It is presumed that the Legislature has expressed its intent in a statute and that it intended what is so expressed." Id. at 969. "A cardinal precept of statutory construction is that where a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and the meaning clear and unmistakable, no justification exists for the use of interpretative devices to fabricate a different meaning." Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110 , 37 P.3d 882, 888.
We begin our review with Oklahoma's implied consent statute, 47 O.S. 2001 § 751. This statute provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes or other public place within this state shall be deemed to have given to consent to a test or tests of such person's blood or breath, for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration[.]" 47 O.S. 2001 § 751(A)(1). If such person refuses the chemical test, DPS "shall revoke" the person's driver's license. 47 O.S. 2001 § 753.*fn1
Thus, under §§ 751 and 753, if the Quail Ridge parking lot is a public parking lot, Justus impliedly consented to taking a chemical test and his refusal to take the test supports DPS' revocation of his driver's license. On the other hand, if the parking lot is not a public parking lot, the implied consent statute is not applicable and his refusal to take a chemical test does not support DPS' revocation of his driver's license.
We look to the statutory definition of public parking lot to resolve the issue. The Legislature has defined public parking lot for purposes of Title 47.*fn2 A public parking lot is "[a]ny parking lot on a right-of-way dedicated to public use or owned by the state or a political subdivision the
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