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State v. Hayes1/30/1998
1998 MT 14
ô1 Michael Hayes (Hayes) appeals from the judgment entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, on his conviction of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), contending that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial in the Yellowstone County Justice Court. We affirm.
ô2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Hayes' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial in the Justice Court based on its interpretation of Section 46-13-401(2), MCA.
BACKGROUND
ô3 Hayes was charged with DUI in the Justice Court. He pleaded not guilty on May 28, 1996, and trial was set for November 27, 1996. On the day before trial, Hayes moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. He argued that the 6-month period for trial of a misdemeanor charge set forth in Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, should be calculated as 180 days and, under such a calculation, his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The justice Court denied the motion, tried Hayes in absentia, found him guilty of DUI and entered sentence and judgment.
ô4 Hayes timely appealed to the District Court and moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial in the Justice Court. After briefing, the District Court denied the motion. Hayes subsequently pleaded guilty to the DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the speedy trial issue. The District Court entered judgment and Hayes appeals.
DISCUSSION
ô5 Did the District Court err in denying Hayes' motion to dismiss
for lack of a speedy trial in Justice Court?
ô6 The District Court rejected Hayes' argument that the statutory speedy trial period should be interpreted to mean 180 calendar days, concluding that the "6 months" set forth in Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, means that a misdemeanor charge generally must be tried within 6 months. On that basis, it denied Hayes' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.
ô7 Whether a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated is a question of law. We review a district court's Conclusion of law to determine whether the interpretation of the law is correct. State v. Keating (Mont. 1997), ___ P.2d ___, ___, 54 St.Rep. 1250, 1252 (citation omitted).
ô8 Under Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, a misdemeanor charge ordinarily must be dismissed if "not brought to trial within 6 months" after the entry of a plea. We previously have held that the statutory 6-month period begins to run on the day following the event which triggers the running of the time limitation and expires 6 months later. See State v. Belgarde (1990), 244 Mont. 500, 507, 798 P.2d 539, 544 (citing State v. Ronningen (1984), 213 Mont. 358, 691 P.2d 1348). Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the 6-month time period began to run on May 29, 1996--the day after Hayes pleaded not guilty--and expired November 29, 1996--6 months later. Hayes' trial was scheduled for, and held on, November 27, 1996, and, as such, the trial was timely for purposes of Section 46-13-401(2), MCA.
ô9 Hayes argues, however, that Belgarde and Ronningen did not specifically focus on the definition of "6 months" as that time period is set forth in Section 46-13-401(2), MCA. He suggests that other cases refer to a precise number of days, rather than 6 months, and contends that those cases support his "more logical" position that 6 months means 180 days, calculated as 6 months containing 30 days each. His arguments are not persuasive.
ô10 It is technically accurate to say that we did not specifically focus on the meaning of the "6 months" language cont
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