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State v. Reynolds1/14/1998
Pfeifer, J.
In this appeal, Reynolds advances nineteen propositions of law. For the reasons that follow, we reject all his propositions of law and affirm each conviction and the death sentence.
In his first proposition of law, Reynolds contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his lead attorney was appointed to represent him only two weeks prior to trial. Sup.R. 20 (formerly C.P.Sup.R. 65) provides that two attorneys, certified pursuant to the rule, must be appointed to represent indigent persons charged with a capital crime. One attorney is designated lead counsel and the other is designated co-counsel. The Committee on the Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Capital Cases certifies attorneys as either lead or co-counsel, based on training and experience. One of the attorneys appointed to an indigent capital defendant must be certified as lead counsel.
Attorneys George Keith and George Pappas were appointed to represent Reynolds. After pretrial motion hearings, but before the trial began, the trial court discovered that neither attorney was certified as lead counsel. Keith moved to withdraw from the case and requested that an attorney certified as lead counsel be appointed. The trial court appointed Kerry O'Brien, a lead-counsel certified attorney. Voir dire began two and a half weeks later.
Reynolds contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because it is unreasonable to expect counsel to prepare for a capital trial in two weeks. The record reflects that the trial court questioned O'Brien extensively concerning his ability to prepare for trial in the short period of time available to him. O'Brien stated that he could be adequately prepared. The court also asked Reynolds and Pappas whether they were comfortable with the timetable. Reynolds and Pappas expressed their agreement with the new arrangement.
O'Brien prepared for the trial by reviewing materials that had been prepared by Pappas and Keith. Pappas remained on the case and provided continuity of representation to Reynolds. The trial court indicated, by journal entry, that new counsel would be granted time to file additional motions and to request a delay if necessary.
At oral argument, Reynolds's counsel invited this court to adopt a per se rule that appointed counsel cannot be required to begin a capital trial within such a short period of time. We decline the invitation. Instead, we examine counsel's performance under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Reynolds must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that prejudice arose from counsel's performance. See Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.
Reynolds has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by lead counsel's belated appointment. We also find no evidence in the record that O'Brien was hampered by his late appointment. O'Brien, separately or together with Pappas, filed motions in addition to those filed by Keith and Pappas, questioned jurors during voir dire, cross-examined the state's witnesses in the trial phase, conducted direct examination in the penalty phase, and gave closing arguments in both phases. We conclude that Reynolds was not prejudiced by the appointment of O'Brien two weeks prior to trial, and accordingly reject the first proposition of law.
In his second
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