Gadd v. State12/31/1997
ly force, to prevent his departure from the scene. Gadd and Randel presented deposition testimony of two police experts, Timothy Perry and Donald Van Blaricom. Each testified that WSP Sgt. Martin should not have approached the vehicle. CPD Sgt. McMahon stated that he exited his vehicle, stood behind the door, pointed his gun at Grigsby, and shouted for him to stop. Gadd and Randel argue that Sgt. McMahon lied and that he never exited his vehicle. Gadd and Randel's experts testified that if he did not exit his vehicle, then he also acted incorrectly, but that if he acted in accordance with his statements, then he acted properly.
CPD and WSP filed summary judgment motions. Finding no evidence that CPD officers had breached their duties, the trial court dismissed CPD as a defendant. The trial court denied WSP's motion for summary judgment, but ruled as a matter of law that there was no duty to use deadly force against Grigsby.
ANALYSIS
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted unless the pleadings, depositions and affidavits on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hontz v. State, 105 Wn.2d 302, 311, 714 P.2d 1176 (1986) (citing CR 56(c); Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985)). The appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court: We consider all evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hontz, 105 Wn.2d at 311 (citing Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982)). The issue of whether a duty of care is owed is a question of law. Sigurdson v. City of Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 155, 158-59, 292 P.2d 214 (1956).
In an action for negligence, the plaintiffs must plead and prove that the defendant had a duty to the complainant, it breached the duty, and the breach was the legal and proximate cause of damages suffered. See Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 777 (citing Peterson v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 435, 671 P.2d 230 (1983); LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 159, 531 P.2d 299 (1975)). Gadd and Randel assert that WSP and CPD officers had a duty to arrest Grigsby, to communicate and coordinate the arrest, to contain the incident, and to use all force necessary to effectuate an arrest, including deadly force. But they do not cite any authority to support the proposition that the police officers had such duties.
A defendant is liable for negligence only for breach of duty owed to the particular plaintiff. When the defendant is a governmental agency, this rule is known as the "public duty doctrine." Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 217, 822 P.2d 2 43 (1992).
Under the public duty doctrine, liability may not be imposed upon the State for a public employee 's negligent conduct unless it is shown that "the duty breached was owed to the injured person as an individual and was not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the public in general (i.e., a duty to all is a duty to no one)." Forest v. State, 62 Wn. App. 363, 368, 814 P.2d 1181(1991) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wn.2d 159, 163, 759 P.2d 447 (1988)) (citations omitted in original).
Four exceptions to the public duty doctrine have thus far been recognized:
"(1) when the terms of a legislative enactment evidence an intent to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons (legislative intent); (2) where governmental agents responsible for enforcing statutory requirements possess actual knowledge of a statutory violation, fail to take corrective action despite a statutory duty to do so, and the plaintiff is within the class the statute inten
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