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State v. Pyle11/18/2004
Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) ("OMVI"), and transported to the Coshocton County Sheriff's Office for a breath test. Appellant refused the test, was booked in, and placed in a cellblock. Appellant was later released without being issued a citation.
{ } On September 26, 2003, the State filed a complaint alleging appellant operated a vehicle, under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1) and endangering children, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(C)(1). A warrant was issued the same date. Appellant was not served with the warrant until April 10, 2004.
{ } Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On May 7, 2004, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the OMVI charge for failure to comply with the provisions of R.C. 2945.71. On May 21, 2004, appellee filed a response to the motion. The trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion on May 24, 2004. On May 27, 2004, the trial court, via Judgment Entry, denied appellant's motion to dismiss. Appellant then entered pleas of no contest to both charges. The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him accordingly.
{ } Appellant now appeals the May 27, 2004 Judgment Entry of the Coshocton Municipal Court denying his motion to dismiss.
{ } Appellant raises the following assignment of error:
{ } "I. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND BY O.R.C. 2945.71 ET SEQ."
I.
{ } Appellant argues the trial court denied him due process of law as he was arrested on August 30, 2003, and the state delayed the endangerment charge by 21 days and the OMVI charge by seven months. Appellant asserts the state completed the investigation on September 4, 2003, but delayed filing formal charges against appellant.
{ } The State maintains the charges and warrant were delayed, because it took approximately six to seven months for appellant to be found, as he was no longer living within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The State notes appellant was not charged on August 30, 2003. Rather, on the date of the accident, appellant was taken into custody, evidence was gathered, and he was released the same night. As such there were no charges pending against appellant until September 26, 2003, the date the original complaint was filed with the trial court.
{ } The complaint alleged:
{ } "Trent W. Pyle on or about the 30th Day of August, 2003, in the County of Coshocton and State of Ohio did: Operate a vehicle within this state in violation of Division (A) of Section 4511.19 of the Revised Code when one or more children under the age of 18 years of age are in the vehicle in violation of section 2919.22(C)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code."
{ } The state issued a warrant on the same date the complaint was filed. Appellant was served with the warrant on April 10, 2004.
{ } We find the speedy trial requirements of R.C. 2945.71 do not begin to run until after the service of summons on appellant for the charges. See, City of Mansfield v. Budea (February 6, 1992) Richland App. No. CA-2889.
{ } The Eighth District Court of Appeals addressed the identical argument raised by appellant in State v. Fitzgerald (March 3, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65435:
{ } "Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 252, held that the time period between the dismissal without prejudice of an original indictment and the filing of a subsequent indictment, premised on the same facts as alleged in the previous indictment, shall not be counted unless the defendant is held in jail or released on bail.
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