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STATE v. PALMER9/18/1996
arrest. . . ." See Iowa Code § 321B.3 (1979) (emphasis added). In order to comply with the literal terms of the statute, the second officer would have had to rearrest the defendant. We concluded such a requirement [554 NW2d Page 867]
would not further the purposes of the statute. Schlemme, 301 N.W.2d at 724. Therefore, we held literal compliance with the statute was not necessary. Id. It is notable that in reaching this conclusion we relied on the fact that both officers were equally trained and both were qualified peace officers who were competent to administer the implied consent procedures. Id. at 722, 724.
The present case is easily distinguishable from Schlemme and Satern. In those cases, there was no challenge to the involved officers' qualifications as peace officers under section 321J.1(7). In both cases, the lack of compliance with chapter 321J was merely technical in the sense noncompliance did not jeopardize any of the purposes underlying the implied consent procedures. We cannot say the same here.
Douglass was not a qualified peace officer for purposes of the implied consent statute. Moreover, his lack of qualifications directly impacts attainment of the legislative goal to protect citizens from indiscriminate testing and harassment. To conclude that a peace officer administering the implied consent procedures can rely on the observations of one not qualified by statute clearly undermines the purpose behind the legislature's narrow definition of peace officer. Consequently, we hold that the deputy sheriff's reliance on Officer Douglass's arrest of Palmer did not constitute substantial compliance with section 321J.6.
The State assails this holding, arguing that it can substantially comply with the statute in cases like Palmer's by merely having the second, qualified officer rearrest the defendant. The State argues this technical compliance with the statute is a meaningless gesture. Such an action would certainly be meaningless if the only requirement was that the second officer speak the magical words, "I hereby rearrest you." We think, however, this mere formality would not result in substantial compliance with the statute.
What is lacking here is an arrest based on an objective and reliable assessment of intoxication made by one deemed competent under section 321J.1(7). Consequently, to substantially comply with section 321J.6 under the facts of this case, it would have been necessary for the deputy sheriff to have independently assessed, based on his personal observations or tests that he administered, whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was intoxicated.
The State also argues the deputy sheriff's invocation of the implied consent procedures resulted in a de facto rearrest of Palmer. It reasons the deputy possessed the same information as Douglass by virtue of the shared information rule and therefore, the deputy had probable cause to believe Palmer was operating a vehicle while intoxicated. We cannot accept this argument for the same reasons we have rejected the State's substantial compliance argument. Douglass was not qualified under chapter 321J to make an arrest that could provide the basis for invoking implied consent. That is because he lacked the training required by that chapter. Under these circumstances we will not allow the deputy to rely on Douglass's "knowledge" any more than we would allow the deputy to rely on Douglass's arrest.
Our conclusion in no way undermines the validity of our prior cases applying the rule of shared knowledge in other situations. See, e.g., State v. Owens, [554 NW2d Page 868]
418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988); State v. Schubert, 346 N.
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