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STATE v. ROCHE8/20/1996
se a remand was necessary to resolve inconsistent factual findings before we could determine whether the constitutional question was squarely presented.
We noted in Bento that the legislature did not intend to treat an operator involved in a vehicle fatality in the same manner as an operator involved in a routine OUI stop. Bento, 600 A.2d at 1096. That observation bears repeating here. In the latter scenario probable cause must exist at the time a blood test is administered. In the former scenario, the statute contemplates that probable cause is implicated only when admission of the test result is sought at the trial. The justification for the search is linked to the gravity of the accident as well as the evanescent nature of evidence of intoxication and the deterrent effect on
Skinner gauged the reasonableness of the search by looking at the surrounding circumstances: the fact the delay in testing would frustrate the government's purpose, the heavy regulation of the railway industry, and the minor intrusion occasioned by the tests. Certainly the State faces the same problems with testing delay, and the intrusion occasioned by Maine's scheme is no more than that in Skinner. Finally, although our state's highways may not be as regulated as railways, they are nonetheless highly regulated.
The Court's holding in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), provides further support for our decision. In Sitz the Court upheld the constitutionality of a highway sobriety checkpoint program. The Court held that a vehicle stop amounted to a seizure, but concluded that it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because there could be no dispute about the magnitude of, and the States' interest in, eradicating the problem of intoxicated drivers. Because the seizure was so limited in time and intrusion, the balance weighed in favor of the state. The balance also weighs in the State's favor in the case at hand. We are mindful of the fact that courts in other jurisdictions have taken a more restricted view of the impact of Skinner when applied to highway fatalities. See King v. Ryan, 153 Ill.2d 449, 180 Ill.Dec. 260, 607 N.E.2d 154 (1992); Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321 (1992). We are unable to conclude that the public's interest in preventing highway fatalities resulting from drunk drivers is less compelling than its interest in ensuring safety in rail transportation. Driving is an activity that is increasingly subject to regulation, and one involved in a fatal accident would ordinarily expect to be subjected to an investigation. Any intrusion added by section 1312 is not sufficient to constitutionally compel a requirement for a simultaneous determination of probable cause.
Defendant's argument that the blood test results were inadmissible because no independent probable cause was proved pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 is without merit. Our review of the court's ruling relative to the issue demonstrates competent evidence of independent probable cause.
The Defendant's remaining argument is without merits and requires no discussion.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
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