STATE v. EVANS
10/3/1994
FACTS
Shortly before noon on July 18, 1991, Lauren and Larrae Bernardo received fatal injuries when they were struck by a truck as they walked along Hardscrabble Road with their grandparents. Two other grandchildren were also injured. The truck did not stop and was last observed by the children's grandfather (Grandfather) turning left onto Clemson Road.
After an intense investigation, police charged Evans with two counts of murder, two counts of felony
A joint trial was commenced on April 20, 1992. The State presented evidence that the children were struck by a blue and silver 1983 or 1984 Chevrolet pick-up truck with "stacked" headlights that had tool boxes and a ladder rack mounted in the bed. Although the truck was never found, several witnesses verified that Evans was known to have a truck matching that description. Other witnesses testified that they observed a blue and silver pick-up truck in the area around the time of the accident. One motorist testified that a Chevrolet pick-up with "a faded blue or real light silver color" tailgate passed him in a curve and then turned onto Thornton Drive. Another witness testified that he was visiting a relative next door to Evans' residence on Thornton Drive at around 12:30 p.m. when a blue and silver pick-up truck with damage on the right front sped into Evans' driveway. This witness, who was familiar with both Evans and Altman, stated that Evans was driving, Altman was the passenger, and the truck had what appeared to be red paint in the damaged area. The State also presented a witness who testified that Evans discussed the accident with him while they were incarcerated together. According to this witness, Evans admitted that he had been drinking, took his eyes off the road for a moment, and hit the children.
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Evans of two counts each of manslaughter, leaving the scene of an accident involving death, and leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury . Evans appealed.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Codefendant's Confession
A witness for the State testified that Altman discussed the accident with him and made the statement, "I wasn't driving anyway." Evans contends that the statement implicates him as the driver and, because Altman did not testify at trial, the admission of this testimony violated
In Bruton the Supreme Court held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause are violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant's statement that expressly inculpates a defendant, even if a cautionary instruction is given. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. at 1627-28. The Court, in Richardson v. Marsh, specifically declined to extend this rule to the situation when a defendant's name or any reference to defendant is redacted, even though the statement's application to him is linked up by other evidence properly admitted against the defendant. 481 U.S. 200, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987).
Under Richardson, admission of the inferentially incriminating codefendant's confession which redacts any reference to the defendant does not violate the Confrontation Clause if a proper limiting instruction is given. Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. Based on the analysis in Richardson, we find that Bruton does not bar the statement presented here. The statement did not "on its face" incriminate Evans, although its incriminating import was certainly inferable from other evidence that was properly admitted against him. See United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1991) (Adopting the reasoning of Richardson, Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admittance of redacted confessio
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