 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Stoppel7/3/2002
te v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa1988).
Reasonable Suspicion.
As a prerequisite for invoking implied consent, the police must have reasonable grounds to believe a defendant was operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit. Iowa Code § 321J.6(1) (1999). Reasonable grounds are measured according to the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time implied consent is invoked. State v. Boleyn, 547 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa1996). Reasonable grounds exist when those facts would warrant a prudent person's belief that an offense has been committed. Munson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 513 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted).
The facts to be considered in making this determination were not limited to those observed by Trooper Dickson, as he was alerted, via dispatch, of Deputy Jens's observations that alcohol had been involved in a fatal accident. Where there is at least some minimal communication as between officers, the shared or collective knowledge doctrine is applied. State v. Thornton, 300 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 1981). Accordingly, we presume Trooper Dickson shared the knowledge held by Deputy Jens. See Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 342 ("it is well established that when police officers are acting in concert, the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all"). The district court therefore was required to consider all of the factors surrounding the accident, including Stoppel's admission he had been drinking and had come from a bar, as well as the presence of the open containers. See also Pointer v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 546 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Iowa1996) ("both direct and circumstantial evidence may be considered in determining whether reasonable grounds exist").
Moreover, the question for the court was not whether it found reasonable grounds to believe Stoppel was operating while intoxicated but whether, as an objective matter, see Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1976), a prudent person would so find. While the court may have found Stoppel's bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes were the result of crying, it cannot be said that no reasonably prudent person would take the same evidence as proof of intoxication, especially in light of the other evidence, including the odor of alcohol on or about Stoppel and his admission he had been drinking.
Since it is undisputed the blood specimen test yielded a bottom result of .99, we presume the court's statement that there was no credible evidence Stoppel tested close to the legal limit was a credibility finding regarding the PBT results. However, even if we presume the PBT results were not close to the limit,
hat the test result was less than the legal limit does not automatically eliminate any reasonable grounds for believing [a defendant] was driving while intoxicated. If, as in this case, the preliminary results showed the presence of alcohol, a prudent person would be warranted in requesting a more accurate test. Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 343.
Given all the facts presented at the suppression hearing, it was error for the district court to rule that no prudent person would look at the facts within the officer's knowledge and formulate a reasonable belief that Stoppel was operating while intoxicated. We therefore reverse the district court's suppression ruling, and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Page 1 2 Iowa DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|