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State v. Bartlett8/14/2002
intent beyond the express terms of the statute." Horsman v. Wahl, 551 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Iowa 1996). If a statute is ambiguous, however, we will resort to rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the statute. See Green, 470 N.W.2d at 18. "Ambiguity exists if reasonable minds may differ or may be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute." Id. To resolve ambiguity, and ultimately determine legislative intent, we will consider the statutory language, the objects sought to be accomplished, the evils sought to be remedied, and a reasonable construction that effectuates the statutory purpose rather than one that defeats it. Id. (citations omitted).
We find the meaning of section 321J.8 is unclear. We are uncertain whether "a chemical test" as used in the introductory paragraph of that section and "refuses to submit to the test" in paragraph (1) include a blood test, or merely refer to urine and breath tests. Therefore, we look to the purpose of section 321J.8, and we seek a reasonable construction that will advance that purpose.
Section 321J.8 requires that, after a driver has been asked to submit to a chemical test, the officer must advise the driver of the consequences of refusing to take the test and the consequences of a positive test result, including the potential periods of revocation. Our supreme court has quoted the intent behind section 321J.8 as follows:
The clear intent of section 321J.8 is to provide a person who has been required to submit a chemical test a basis for evaluation and decision-making in regard to either submitting or not submitting to the test. This involve a weighing of the consequences if the test is refused against the consequences if the test reflects a controlled substance, drug, or alcohol concentration in excess of the "legal" limit. This is a determination that will frequently be made without benefit of counsel by the person of whom request is made . . . . Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Iowa 2001).
We must determine whether the purpose behind section 321J.8 would be frustrated if a driver is not advised that refusal to submit to a blood test would not result in the revocation of his driver's license pursuant to section 321J.9. We conclude the purpose behind section 321J.8 would not be frustrated in such a situation. If a driver refuses to submit to a blood test, "the peace officer shall then determine which one of the other two substances shall be tested and shall offer the test." Iowa Code § 321J.6(2). Use of the word "shall" imposes a duty. Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a). Therefore, the peace officer has a duty to offer either a urine or breath test following the driver's refusal to provide a blood test. If the driver refuses either of these tests, his license will be revoked pursuant to the provisions of sections 321J.6(2) and 321J.9.
Deputy Pothoff invoked implied consent and requested a blood test. He informed Bartlett of the applicable periods of revocation for refusing to submit to a chemical test. These revocation periods would apply to refusal to submit to either a breath or urine test. If Bartlett had refused a blood test, Deputy Pothoff had a duty to request either a breath or urine test of Bartlett. If Bartlett refused to submit to either of these tests, his license would have been subject to the revocation periods read to him by Deputy Pothoff.
Under these circumstances, we think the statutory purpose was achieved without the necessity of Deputy Pothoff advising Bartlett that his license would not be revoked if he refused to submit to a blood test. No useful purpose would be served by requiring that a peace officer inform a driver that the refusal to submit t
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