State v. Gutierrez7/10/2002
hat are material to the issues raised in this appeal are not in dispute. Therefore, we exercise free review in determining whether constitutional standards have been met in light of the facts presented. State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 291, 32 P.3d 679, 683 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 772, 839 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1992).
The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling short of arrest. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The stop of a vehicle is a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to Fourth Amendment standards. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406, 679 P.2d 1123, 1124 (1984). When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001). Because the stop of a vehicle and detention of its driver is generally a detention of any passengers as well, passengers have standing to contest the reasonableness of the detention. Haworth, 106 Idaho at 406, 679 P.2d at 1124; State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 237, 880 P.2d 265, 267 (Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop for speeding is not contested. Rather, Angel and Anthony assert that Officer Bunderson unlawfully prolonged the detention after the traffic control purpose for the stop had been satisfied. They contend that after issuing the warning and returning Cheek's license and registration, Bunderson impermissibly continued the detention by questioning Cheek about alcohol, drugs and weapons--matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop--without reasonable suspicion. The defendants point out that Cheek was not told by Officer Bunderson that he could leave when his documents were handed back but, instead, Bunderson immediately proceeded with questioning about the contents of Cheek's car.
The State responds that once Cheek received his license and registration, he was free to leave and any detention ended. The continuing conversation between Bunderson and Cheek, the State argues, was consensual and therefore did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The State also argues in the alternative that even if the questioning was not a consensual interaction, it was reasonable as a brief extension of the traffic stop.
A. The Questioning Was Not Consensual
Not all contacts between policemen and citizens constitute seizures of the individuals. A seizure occurs only when the officer, through physical force or show of authority, restrains an individual's liberty. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612, 7 P.3d 219, 221 (2000). The test to determine whether someone is restrained is whether, considering all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would communicate to a reasonable person that he or she is not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his or her business. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 536, 5 P.3d 993, 997 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App. 1991). Thus, a traffic stop may evolve into a consensual encounter if the officer returns the driver's license, registrati
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Idaho DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|