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State of Alaska12/15/2000
3 assumed the attributes of a punitive measure; for it "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose." Underage drinking has traditionally been regarded as criminal misconduct; many members of the community attach significant social and moral opprobrium to the conduct; and the statutorily prescribed consequence of immediate license revocation unquestionably amounts to a severe sanction. Because the statute imposes a harsh, mandatory penalty for misconduct that has no necessary or close relation to bad driving, its sanction will naturally be seen not as a remedial measure addressing traffic safety, but as punishment aiming directly at the underlying offense -- underage possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs. Punishment of this kind "is the implicit sine qua non of a 'criminal prosecution.'"
Given these circumstances, our case law interpreting the Alaska Constitution compels the conclusion that former AS 28.15.183 imposed a criminal sanction. To revoke a license under circumstances amounting to criminal punishment, the state must offer appropriate procedural safeguards; as we explained in Baker, the state may not impose criminal punishment without criminal process.
Courts in other states have allowed license suspension to follow automatically from drug or underage drinking offenses. But the laws in those states uniformly require that a conviction precede the punishment. In upholding their statutes as constitutional, the courts in those states have explained that the revocation of a driver's license is rationally related to a legitimate state interest precisely because it punishes and deters illegal alcohol or drug use. Thus, those decisions tend to confirm our conclusion that former AS 28.15.183 must be viewed as imposing a criminal penalty.
Here, because the state failed to offer Niedermeyer the safeguards of criminal process that normally apply to criminal punishment, we affirm the superior court's conclusion that Niedermeyer's license was revoked without due process of law.
E. Vagueness
Niedermeyer further argues that, by basing license revocation on the act of "possession" of alcohol, former AS 28.15.183 introduces an element of unconstitutional vagueness. A statute may be void for vagueness if its language fails to "give adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibited" or if its "imprecise language encourages arbitrary enforcement by allowing prosecuting authorities undue discretion to determine the scope of its prohibitions." Applying this standard, we find no constitutional deficiency here. "Possession" is a common term with a generally accepted meaning: having or holding property in one's power; the exercise of dominion over property. This meaning provides adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. Niedermeyer asserts that the statute's use of the undefined term "possession" is sufficiently vague to invite inconsistent enforcement. But we will not invalidate a statute on this basis "'absent evidence of a history of arbitrary or capricious enforcement.'" Since Niedermeyer failed to present evidence suggesting a history of arbitrary enforcement, we must overturn the superior court's finding of vagueness.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although former AS 28.15.183 has an indirect remedial purpose sufficient to insulate it from a substantive due process challenge, its direct effect is to punish underage possession and consumption of alcohol and drugs -- conduct traditionally punishable only by criminal process. Because Niedermeyer's license was revoked without attendant criminal process, we AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.
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