Smith v. State12/22/2000
ve juror should not be disqualified for prejudices or biases if it appears from his or her answers and demeanor that the influence of those prejudices and biases can be eliminated and that, if chosen as a juror, he or she would render a verdict rendered according to the law and the evidence. Mann v. State, 581 So. 2d 22, 25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Minshew v. State, 542 So. 2d 307 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), overruled on other ground, Ex parte Gentry, 689 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1996).
In regard to the prosecutor's claim that M.M., L.Y., and L.W. were untruthful in addressing the questions put to them during voir dire, we acknowledge that voir dire examination is critical in ensuring juror impartiality. It enables the parties to probe potential jurors for prejudice and bias, both known and unknown. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a potential juror's being excused for cause. While demonstrated bias can result in a veniremember's removal, hints of bias, not sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause, assist the parties in exercising their peremptory strikes. If the process is to serve its purpose, veniremembers must give truthful answers. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998).
"Nevertheless, we must be tolerant, as jurors may forget incidents long buried in their minds, misunderstand a question or bend the truth a bit to avoid embarrassment. The Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation; even an intentionally dishonest answer is not fatal, so long as the falsehood does not bespeak a lack of impartiality. See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984)." Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d at 973; see also United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65 (2nd Cir. 1993). "Few voir dires are impeccable and most irregularities can be shrugged off as immaterial to the fairness of the trial." Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d at 984.
"A court confronted with a colorable claim of juror bias must undertake an investigation of the relevant facts and circumstances." Id. at 974. See also Hagood v. State, [Ms. CR-95-1915, August 14, 1998] __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, we turn to the relevant facts and circumstances regarding the removal of M.M., L.Y., and L.W. to discover if any of these veniremembers held absolute bias to warrant removal. The voir dire began with the trial court asking the assembled venire general preliminary questions directed toward their qualification to serve as jurors, and then counsel for the parties asked general questions of the entire venire. The assembled venire was asked, among the questions, if anyone was related by blood or marriage to the defendant, if anyone knew anything about the facts of the case, if anyone had discussed the case, or if anyone had said or had heard anyone say that the victims got what they deserved because of where they were and what they were doing when they were killed. Although several members of the venire responded to a number of the inquiries, M.M., L.Y., and L.W. did not respond to any of them. (Any veniremember who wished to answer any question privately was invited to do so at the bench.) Then counsel were permitted to question individually any veniremember. The prosecutor individually questioned M.M., L.Y., and L.W.
We first note that M.M., L.Y., and L.W. were challenged, in part, because they denied having made or having heard statements about the victims' getting what they deserved; it should be remembered, however, that they were under oath, and no evidence has been introduced to contradict them in this regard. Although t
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