Smith v. State12/22/2000
n instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication and duress.
"`A trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, provid those instructions accurately reflect the law and the facts of the case. Ingram v. State, [Ms. CR-94-1733, August 27, 1999] __So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Raper v. State, 584 So. 2d 544 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)). Moreover, this Court does not review jury instructions in isolation, instead we consider the instruction as a whole. Stewart v. State, 601 So. 2d 491 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)." Living v. State, [Ms. CR-98-1326, May 26, 2000] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). Further, a trial court's oral charge must be construed as a whole and must be given a reasonable -- not a strained -- construction. Wilson v. State, [Ms. CR-97-2569, November 19, 1999] __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). See also Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1, 63 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 758 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1999). Finally, it is always presumed that the jury followed the court's instructions, Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d 122, 218 (Ala. 1993), aff'd on remand, 730 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), aff'd, 730 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. 1999), and that the jury considered the entire charge.
We disagree with the appellant's argument that " ecause the jury was told that it had to already have decided whether to convict or acquit on the capital charge, it very likely thought intoxication relevant only to the crimes of murder and manslaughter." (Appellant's brief, p. 69.) It was logical and efficient for the trial court to instruct on voluntary intoxication after the elements of the manslaughter charge. See Fletcher v. State, 621 So. 2d 1010, 1019 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) ("Voluntary intoxication and manslaughter as a lesser included offense of intentional murder are interrelated and often overlapping subjects."). Viewing the appellant's claim in the context of the entire charge, as we must, we find that the jury was clearly informed that, in determining whether the element of intent of the capital offense was present, it could consider whether voluntary intoxication negated that required intent. See also Living v. State, __ So. 2d at __ (under instructions on intoxication similar to the instruction here, the trial court "clearly and unambiguously instructed the jury that it could consider intoxication when it considered the offenses of capital murder and murder"). This is the only reasonable construction of the court's charge as a whole. "We think it a reasonable assumption that the jury took a common sense view of the instructions and gave them their plainly apparent meaning." Harris v. State, 412 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
We also reject the appellant's conclusion that the jury was not allowed to properly consider the defense of duress. More specifically, in regard to his argument that the jurors may have thought that duress applied only to the lesser offenses of murder and manslaughter, the appellant makes the erroneous assumption that the defense of duress is applicable to capital murder and, for that matter, to murder. Section 13A-3-30(d) provides that this defense is unavailable in a prosecution for murder or for any killing of another under aggravated circumstances, as provided by §§ 13A-5-39 et seq. See also Boyd v. State, 715 So. 2d 825, 837 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (the defense of duress is inapplicable to a charge of capital murder), aff'd, 715 So. 2d 852 (Ala. 1998); Commentary, § 13A-3-31 ("This section retains the view that duress will not be extended to cases where an innocent third person is intentionally killed."); 2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, § 177(g)(1) (1984). Thus, again, the order of the trial court's instructions made perfect sense
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