Smith v. State12/22/2000
istorted view of the evidence, the case, or the appellant." (Appellant's brief, p. 77.) He calls our attention to only two instances during the trial where he contends the court acted improperly. No objections were made at trial to these alleged improper comments. He first argues that the trial court erred in telling the venire during voir dire that there would be a second or penalty phase in the trial; and, second, that error occurred when the trial court made comments that suggested to the jury that there existed incriminating evidence against the appellant that it would not get to hear. We do not agree with the appellant's conclusion. A fair reading of the trial court's comments clearly shows that the trial court did not tell the members of the venire that there definitely would be a penalty phase, but on the contrary, told them that there would be a penalty phase only if the appellant was found guilty. The trial court's comments outlining the trial procedure to be followed were correct.
Likewise, the record does not support the appellant's conclusion that the trial court led the jury to believe there was incriminating evidence that it would not get to hear. The comments referred to were simply the court telling the jurors that during their service on the jury they should avoid all media coverage of the trial, that information in the media was not evidence to be considered, and that they must base their decision solely on the evidence presented and admitted in the courtroom during the trial. The instructions complained of were not misleading and were proper. After reviewing the entire record, we find no merit in the appellant's contentions concerning the trial court's comments, and certainly no plain error.
XXVII.
The appellant contends that Alabama's method of execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
"The use of the electric chair, as a means of satisfying a capital punishment, has repeatedly withstood constitutional challenge. See Woods v. State, [Ms. CR-97-0027, December 10, 1999] __ So. 2d __ (Ala.Cr.App. 1999); Jackson v. State, [Ms. CR-97-2050, May 28, 1999] __ So. 2d __ (Ala.Cr.App. 1999); Scott v. State, 728 So. 2d 164 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997), aff'd, 728 So. 2d 172 (Ala.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct. 87 ... (1999); Williams v. State, 556 So. 2d 737 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 556 So. 2d 744 (Ala. 1987), on remand, 556 So. 2d 746 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), after remand, 571 So. 2d 336 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989), aff'd, 571 So. 2d 338 (Ala. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 938 ... (1991)." Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-98-0206, May 26, 2000] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). We find no merit in this contention.
XXVIII.
The appellant contends that Alabama's system of limiting the compensation for attorneys appointed on capital cases to $1,000 for out-of-court work for each phase of the trial violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, constitutes a taking without just compensation, violates the Due Process Clause, deprives indigent capital defendants of the effective assistance of counsel, and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
"These claims have repeatedly been rejected. See Ex parte Smith, 698 So. 2d 219 (Ala.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 957 ... (1997); May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1310 (Ala.1995); Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 ... (1985); Smith v. State, 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 581 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1991), on remand, 581 So. 2d 536 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), after remand, 698 So. 2d 189 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996), aff'd, 698 So. 2d 219 (Ala.), cert. denied, 52
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