Smith v. State12/22/2000
2 U.S. 957 ... (1997).
"'It should be noted that the Alabama Legislature recently passed the "Investment in Justice Act of 1999," and, in pertinent part, that Act amended § 15-12-21. Under the new Act, the rate of compensation for attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants is increased to $50 per hour for in- court time and $30 per hour for out-of-court time, with no limit on compensation for an attorney in a case involving a capital offense. Moreover, effective October 1, 2000, the hourly rate increases to $40 per hour for out-of-court time and $60 per hour for in-court time.' McWhorter v. State, [Ms. CR-93-1448, August 27, 1999] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala.Cr.App.1999)." Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-98-0206, May 26, 2000] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
In regard to the appellant's contentions that the statutory limitation on attorney fees constitutes a taking without just compensation and violates the separation of powers,
"these issues have been previously addressed and rejected by this Court and by the Alabama Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 ... (1985); Hyde v. State, [cite]; Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), aff'd, 673 So. 2d 473 (Ala.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 ... (1996); May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1307 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), writ quashed, 672 So. 2d 1310 (Ala.1995); Johnson v. State, 620 So. 2d 679 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), rev'd on other grounds, 620 So. 2d 709 (Ala.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905 ... (1993); and Smith v. State, supra." Broadnax v. State, [Ms. CR-97-0113, March 31, 2000] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
For these reasons, we find no merit in the appellant's contentions regarding the limit on compensation for attorneys in capital cases.
XXIX.
The appellant contends that the cumulative effect of all the errors he alleges on appeal entitles him to a new trial and/or a new jury sentencing hearing. We disagree.
In accordance with Ala.R.App.P. 45A, we have examined the record in this case for any plain error, whether or not brought to our attention or to the attention of the trial court. We have found no "plain error or defect in the proceedings" in the guilt phase of the trial or in the jury-sentencing phase. Thus, we have determined that each alleged error is without merit or is harmless. We further find, upon considering these alleged errors cumulatively, that their cumulative effect, likewise, does not require reversal. Jackson v. State, [Ms. CR-97-0998, March 31, 2000] __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
In its sentencing order, the trial court stated the following in reference to the statutory mitigating circumstances: "I have considered all of the statutory mitigating circumstances and find that some of them exist." (Emphasis added.) However, the trial court addressed only one: § 13A-5-51(6). (The court addressed this one even though it had not submitted this circumstance to the jury for its consideration, yet did not address the two it did submit to the jury, §§ 13A-5-51(2) and (3).) In sentencing a defendant in a capital case, the trial court is required, among other things, to enter specific written findings concerning the existence or non-existence of each mitigating circumstance enumerated in § 13A-5-51. Jones v. State, 520 So. 2d 543 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff'd, 520 So. 2d 553 (Ala. 1988); Hubbard v. State, 382 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), aff'd, 382 So. 2d 597 (Ala. 1980), rev'd on remand on other grounds, 405 So. 2d 695 (Ala. 1981); § 13A-5-47. Clearly, a finding by the trial court that "some" of the statutory mitigating circumstances exist, without identifying them, is insufficient.
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