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People v. Ellison12/4/2000
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
EN BANC RULE MADE ABSOLUTE
JUSTICE COATS concurs in the judgment only.
In this original proceeding we hold that the definition of knowledge in Colorado's driving under restraint statute does not violate the guarantees of due process of law. The statute provides that if a person drives with "knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint," he commits a misdemeanor. The Pueblo county court ruled that this language offends due process of law guarantees because it permits a conviction when the defendant was not aware of the restraint on his license or privilege to drive. On appeal, the Pueblo district court affirmed the county court. We hold that this language does not violate constitutional standards of due process. Hence, we make our rule absolute and order the district court to vacate its order affirming the trial court, to enter an order reversing the trial court's order, and to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case arises out of the consolidated appeal of separate cases brought in Pueblo county court. The district attorney charged Respondent Erik Ellison with driving under restraint. In an unrelated case, the district attorney also charged Respondent Daniel Bartholomew with Driving Under Restraint. The driving under restraint statute makes it a misdemeanor for a person to drive "with knowledge" that such person's license is restrained. Knowledge is defined under the statute as "actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint." § 42-2-138(4)(a) (emphasis added).
Each defendant filed a motion to strike the emphasized language from the statute on the grounds that it would allow a jury to convict based on the knowledge of a hypothetical reasonable person, rather than on what the defendant actually knew. Concluding that the challenged language violated due process of law, the county court granted these motions and required the prosecution to prove that each defendant had actual knowledge of the restraint.
In reaching this conclusion the trial court relied on People v. Johnson, 193 Colo. 199, 564 P.2d 116 (1977), where we held unconstitutional the knowledge requirement of the theft by receiving statute then in effect.
That knowledge requirement unconstitutionally permitted a conviction in situations where the defendant was unaware that the property he received was stolen, if a reasonable person would have known that such property was stolen. 193 Colo. at 200, 564 P.2d at 118. We noted in Johnson that felony theft may not be based on a defendant's negligence or failure to act reasonably, but rather due process requires that the state of mind for felony theft be that of the actual defendant.
There is a constitutional proscription against conviction of a defendant charged with felony by theft if it is predicated upon his negligence or his failure to exercise the intelligence of an ordinary prudent man. The standard of culpability, in order to be constitutional, must be what the state of mind of the particular defendant was, not what a jury concludes might be that of a fictional reasonably prudent man. Id.
Consolidating the two defendants' appeals, the district court affirmed the rulings of the county court, holding that both cases were "governed by the principles pronounced by the Colorado Supreme Cou
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