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Tessmer v. State

11/30/2000

id not give an improper sequential charge. Furthermore, the verdict form demonstrates that the jury followed the trial court's instruction -- it considered voluntary manslaughter and found Tessmer "not guilty" of that offense. Thus, the purpose of Edge was achieved. Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (435 SE2d 600) (1993) (giving of sequential charge is not reversible error where verdict form demonstrates that jury considered and rejected offense of voluntary manslaughter).


4. The trial court did not err in permitting an expert to testify in rebuttal that, in his opinion, Tessmer was not suffering from the battered person syndrome, and that she did not believe that force was necessary to avoid death or great bodily injury. On direct examination, Tessmer's own expert averred that she did suffer from the battered person syndrome and did believe death or great bodily injury was imminent. Thus, the State's expert rebutted the testimony of Tessmer's expert. Contrary to Tessmer's assertion, the State's expert did not comment on Tessmer's veracity -- he simply commented on the applicability of the battered person syndrome to the facts of this case.


5. Of the 30 potential jurors, 17 were female and 13 were male. Tessmer used 9 of 12 peremptory challenges to strike male jurors. The State challenged Tessmer's strikes, asserting she had engaged in gender discrimination.


The trial court determined that the State set forth a prima facie case of gender discrimination, and it called upon Tessmer to come forward with gender-neutral reasons for her strikes. Tessmer's counsel explained why she struck the male jurors. As to Willie Williams, Tessmer's counsel said that she found him to be very soft spoken and did not think he would stand by his convictions. She added that Williams was a veteran of the army. The State countered by pointing out that Tessmer did not strike soft spoken women jurors, nor did she strike another army veteran. The trial court determined that the strike was exercised in a discriminatory manner and it ordered that Williams be seated on the jury.


Tessmer asserts the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion to her when it considered the State's challenge to her strike. In this regard, Tessmer argues that the trial court erroneously rejected her gender-neutral explanation and concluded prematurely that that explanation was pretextual. We disagree.


The trial court must conduct a three-step test to evaluate claims that a party used peremptory challenges in a gender discriminatory manner. Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509, 510 (467 SE2d 562) (1996). First, the opponent of the strike must set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. At that point, the proponent of the strike can be called upon to give a neutral explanation for the strike. Then, and only then can the trial court decide whether the opponent of the strike proved gender discrimination. Id. The important thing to remember is that, while the burden of production shifts at step two, the burden of persuasion always rests with the opponent of the strike.


The record shows that the trial court engaged in the entire three-step process. It heard from the State and found a prima facie case of gender discrimination. The burden of production shifted to Tessmer and the trial court considered her explanation. Then the trial court heard and considered the State's response, and it found gender discrimination. The trial court did not end its analysis at step two; it did not shift the burden of persuasion to Tessmer.


6. In a motion for a new trial, Tessmer asserted the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), because it failed to

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