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Beaucage v. City Of Rockland10/27/2000
Reporter of Decisions
Submitted on Briefs: September 27, 2000
The City of Rockland appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Cole, J.) contending that the trial court erred in finding "good cause" for Carol Beaucage's failure to make a timely notice of claim as required by the Maine Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107 (1980 & Supp. 1999). We affirm in part and vacate in part.
Carol Beaucage, as personal representative of the Estate of William Beaucage, brought a suit against the City of Rockland and others seeking damages for the death of William Beaucage. William Beaucage was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by Dana Rolerson Jr. when that vehicle left the road at a high rate of speed and crashed, resulting in Beaucage's death. In Count III of the complaint (the only claim asserted against the City, and, therefore, the only count at issue in this appeal), Beaucage alleges that, approximately 45 to 60 minutes prior to the accident, agents of the City had direct contact with Rolerson. Beaucage claims that those agents, police officers, were negligent because they knew, or should have known, that Rolerson was driving under the influence of alcohol, and that "using prudent and proper police practices, they should have detained Rolerson and/or impounded his vehicle." Beaucage asserts that she was unable to give the requisite 180-day notice because information concerning the City's involvement was not released until after Rolerson had pled guilty to manslaughter.
The City moved to dismiss Beaucage's complaint on the basis of her failure to serve a notice of claim on the City pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107. Beaucage responded with the affidavit of Emmet Meara, a reporter for the Bangor Daily News, asserting that it was not public knowledge that Rolerson's vehicle had been stopped prior to the accident. The City responded to the Meara affidavit with the affidavit of Stephen Johnson, a former Rockland police officer who had contact with Rolerson on the date of the accident.
The court denied the City's motion, finding "good cause" for the late filing on the basis that "the Sheriff's Department, State Police, DA and Defense Attorneys pursuant to confidentiality statutes and constitutional particulars stopped all dissemination of information until [Rolerson] pled guilty." The City then appealed.
The filing of the affidavits converted the City's motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment. See In re Magro, 655 A.2d 341, 342 (Me. 1995) (citing M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)). The City demonstrated that Beaucage's notice of claim was not received before the expiration of the 180-day period; therefore, the burden was on Beaucage to "generate an issue of fact on the question of good cause so as to preclude summary judgment." Erickson v. State, 444 A.2d 345, 350 (Me. 1982); see also McNicholas v. Bickford, 612 A.2d 866, 869 (Me. 1992) (the plaintiff must establish good cause to invoke the exception). Rather than finding a material issue of fact, the court expressly found that Beaucage had established good cause. By making such a finding on the pleadings, the court effectively found that there were no genuine issues of material fact on the issue of good cause, and Beaucage was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on that discrete issue. Faced with a motion for a summary judgment, the trial court's task is to determine whether there is a material issue of fact. Although a summary judgment may be rendered against the moving party, if an issue of fact exists, the court must deny the motion. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c).
"We review the grant of a summary ju
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