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People v. Kulpinski10/17/2000
authorize penalties for what would otherwise be the "same offense." People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 403; 397 NW2d 783 (1986). " umulative punishment of the same conduct under two different statutes in a single trial does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause in either the federal or state system." [Citations omitted.]
Under the present circumstances, defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra.
III.
Defendant next argues an inculpatory statement he made to a police officer while in the hospital following the accident, and without the benefit of Miranda warnings, should have been suppressed, because defendant was in custody at the time of the interview. Defendant also argues the results of the blood alcohol test administered at the hospital should have been suppressed because defendant was not advised of his right to refuse the blood test or of his right to an independent blood test. In a related argument, defendant maintains his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve these alleged errors by objecting to admission of the evidence or by moving to suppress it at the trial court level.
As suggested by defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument, this issue has not been properly preserved for appellate review. In any event, we find defendant's contention in this regard to be without merit.
In People v Peerenboom, 224 Mich App 195, 197-198; 568 NW2d 153 (1997), this Court addressed what it means to be in "custody" for purposes of triggering Miranda warnings:
An officer's obligation to give Miranda warnings to a person attaches only when the person is in custody, meaning that the person has been formally arrested or subjected to a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v California, 511 US 318, 322; 114 S Ct 1526; 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994). "It is now axiomatic that Miranda warnings need only be given in cases involving custodial interrogations." People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 532; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). See also People v Mendez, 225 Mich App 381, 383-384; 571 NW2d 528 (1997).
The record in the instant case indicates the deputy arrived at the hospital in uniform and identified himself to defendant. The deputy testified defendant was not in custody at the time. According to the deputy, defendant was belligerent and smelled strongly of alcohol. The deputy asked him how many beers he had, and defendant replied he had four beers prior to the accident. Based on his observations, the deputy concluded defendant was intoxicated and thus ceased talking with defendant. The deputy testified that, to his knowledge, defendant was not restrained when he talked to him.
Pursuant to Peerenboom, supra, the fact defendant may have been on a cot wearing a neck brace when the deputy spoke briefly with him does not constitute the significant type of restraint required to render him "in custody" for purposes of Miranda warnings; likewise, the fact defendant was in the hospital does not automatically imply that the environment was "coercive." Peerenboom, supra at 197. Defendant had been neither formally arrested nor "subjected to a restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. Furthermore, the deputy did not actually interrogate defendant because it quickly became apparent to him that defendant was intoxicated, and he ceased conversation. Additionally, it is of little significance that defendant was a suspect in the crime. Mendez, supra at 383-384. Therefore, because defendant was not in custody or under arrest when the deputy went to see him at the hospital, the deputy was
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