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State v. Cross11/14/2000
Charles Dale Cross appeals the circuit court's judgment convicting him of the Class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. He contends that the state's evidence was insufficient to establish that he was driving while intoxicated. He also contends that his arrest by Macon police officers was illegal because the alleged infraction occurred outside Macon's jurisdictional limits and that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of a breathalyzer test's results because the state did not establish that it was competent evidence. We affirm the circuit court's judgment.
The evidence established that on December 13, 1998, Macon police officer Christopher Bowzer was dispatched to investigate a report of a person slumped over in the seat of a car parked near U. S. 36 and Long Branch Road. Bowzer found the car parked with its engine running and its headlights on. The driver's door was open, and Cross' legs were hanging out and touching the ground. The car was parked outside Macon's city limits, but, because he was concerned about Cross' health, Bowzer continued to investigate. He found Cross asleep or unconscious, lying across the front seats. Bowzer could not arouse him. Bowzer radioed his dispatcher to summon a Highway Patrol trooper to the scene.
Before a trooper arrived, two other Macon police officers arrived to assist Bowzer. Bowzer testified that one of them, Officer Toal, awakened Cross by shaking him and yelling at him. Cross then turned off the car's headlights and engine and removed the keys from the ignition. He attempted to get out of his car, but Toal told him to remain in the car and took the keys from him. When Toal asked Cross how much he had to drink, Cross responded, "Not enough."
Highway Patrol Trooper Kelley arrived a brief time later and ordered Cross to get into his patrol car. Highway Patrol Trooper John Siecinski arrived moments later and spoke with the Macon officers and Trooper Kelley about what they had observed.
Siecinski testified that he noted a strong odor of intoxicants about Cross and saw two empty beer bottles in Cross' car. He said that Cross' eyes were watery, bloodshot and glassy, his speech was slurred, his balance was "uncertain, swaying . . . wobbling," his walk was "swaying, staggering and slow," and he swayed and was uncertain when asked to turn while walking. Siecinski said that he concluded from this that Cross was intoxicated, but, because of Cross' condition and safety concerns, he decided not to conduct field sobriety tests. Siecinski formally arrested Cross for driving while intoxicated and took him to the Macon County sheriff's office where Cross consented to a breathalyzer test which indicated that his blood alcohol content was .182 percent.
Cross contends that the state's evidence was not sufficient to establish that he was operating a motor vehicle as that term is used in section 577.010.1, RSMo 1994. The statute says, "A person commits the crime of 'driving while intoxicated' if he operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition." In section 577.001.1, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1999, the General Assembly defined "operates:" "As used in this chapter, the term . . . 'operates' . . . means physically driving or operating a motor vehicle."
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain what the General Assembly intended and to give effect to that intent, and we ascertain that intent primarily by deeming the General Assembly to have intended the plain and ordinary meaning of the words it uses in a statute. Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Mo. banc 1998). "Operating" is a broad term which the General Assembly did not define. We presume th
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